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ABSTRACT 
The thesis traces Southern African security dimensions from the Cold War and the 
period of apartheid in South Africa to the post-apartheid era. It makes an attempt to 
investigate the prospects of Southern Africa becoming a security community and the 
processes and practices underlying these efforts. Using the constructivist theory 
approach to international relations, the thesis argues that the preoccupation with 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference, a lack of political will and the absence 
of common values that could help SADC institute binding rules and decision-making 
are the main blocks that prevent the region from asserting itself as a security 
community. All these militate against the idea of mutual accountability among SADC 
member states and have a negative impact on the institutional and functional capacity 
of SADC. This also prevents SADC from dealing with the emerging non-military 
human security threats in the region. In consideration of this, the thesis argues that the 
idea of security community building in Southern Africa remains not only a regional 
issue, but also requires the involvement of extra-regional actors. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, the Southern African region emerged from prolonged conflict related to 
apartheid destabilisation and the Cold War (Matlosa, 2001: 393), both of which 
played a fundamental role as defining features of security in the region. The collapse 
of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa represented a dramatic 
change for the regional security situation (Matlosa, 2001: 393). There was a great 
expectation that this epoch would bring about a period of sustained stability and 
development at national and regional levels (Nathan, 2004: 2). While Southern Africa 
had constituted an 'overlay' before 1974', a 'security complex,2 before 1990 and a 
'security regime') between 1990 and 1994, the prospects after 1994 when South 
Africa became a democracy essentially offered an opportunity for the region to 
become integrated and assert itself as a 'security community,4. 
The advent of democracy in South Africa was followed by the dissolution of the 
Frontline States5 and the establishment of the Southern African Development 
Community' s (SAD C) Organ on Politics Defence and Security6 (OPDS) as the 
regional security architecture. With these developments, the region reached the 
margins of a security community (Bischoff, 2001: 277). The most interesting and 
important dimension was South Africa's change of foreign policy from being a 
I An overlay involves the direct presence of outside powers in the region, which is "strong enough to 
influence the normal operations of security dynamics among the local states" (Buzan, 1991: 198). 
2 Buzan et al. define a security complex as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and 
concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or 
resolved apart from one another" (Buzan et ai, 1998: 12). 
) Jervis defines a security regime as those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be 
restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate. In this regard states will benefit 
by setting up rules and institutions to control the competition among them (Jervis, 1982: 357-358). 
4 Security community is a concept coined by Deutsch to define a group of people that had become 
integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight 
each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. States within a security 
community attain a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and are integrated to 
the point that they entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler, 1998: 7). 
5 Frontline States was established in 1976 as a loose military coalition of Southern African states, 
namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zamhia. Zimbabwe joined the coalition after 
independence (Jaster, 1985: 88) in 1980. 
6 On 28 June 1996 the Southern African Heads of State and Government established a security organ, 
formerly named Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). This sub-regional Organ alluded to 
the structure of SADC's security arrangements and was intended to deal with the prevention of 
conflicts through preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacekeeping. It was also supposed to 
institutionalise ' new security thinking' in its organisational structures and activities (Neethling, 2004: 
I). 
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regional aggressor to that of a democratic state at peace with its neighbours and its 
willingness to acquire the membership of SADC (Bischoff, 200 I: 277). South 
Africa's part in the establishment of the OPDS as a security institutional arrangement 
within SADC, was further intended to mitigate conflicts and improve cooperation at 
the regional level. As a result, the OPDS became a symbol of the ambitious effort on 
the part of SADC to put together national political institutions and harmonise their 
values at both security and political levels (Ngoma, 2003: 19). This marked an 
incremental step towards propelling the region by way of mechanisms for the 
resolution of conflict towards achieving pacific sets of relations. 
According to Adler and Barnett, the notion of a security community amounts to the 
compatibility of core values drawn from common institutions and mutual openness, 
identity and loyalty, integrated to the extent that states entertain dependable 
expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 7). In this context, 
integration means the achievement of a sense of security and of institutions strong and 
pervasive enough to guarantee dependable expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch, 
1957: 3). This framework of analysis is of value in assessing the process of a security 
community building in Southern Africa. 
In Southern Africa, the major assumption is that the achievement of a security 
community can engender trust and common values among member states. Europe, for 
example, is held up as the region where a developed security community exists such 
that political, economic and security motivations have been intertwined in the 
evolution of European regional integration (Wallace, 1994: 9). The region is 
integrated in the sense that states possess the capacity for self-government in which 
the people are the final source and proper beneficiary of the governing authority. 
States have thus developed efficient political institutions, a solid economic base, a 
considerable degree of national unity and the ability to defend each other militarily 
(Jackson and Sorensen, 1996: 23, Sorensen, 1997: 258). While states essentially have 
the monopoly over the means of violence, their military is turned outwards rather than 
inwards in defence against external enemies. Domestic law and order is based above 
all on popular support. The control of the population goes along with the expansion of 
the civil and political rights of citizenship (Sorensen, 1997: 258). Because of their 
shared domestic norms and identities, states do not perceive each other as threats. 
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Despite the potential signals after 1994, empirically this cohesive and integrative 
strategy among states in Europe still eludes Southern Africa. 
Over the last 10 years, the Southern African Development Community has ever more 
lagged behind in its ability to deal with broad security issues. Instead, the institutional 
process of building security in the context of building integration among its members 
remains a prolonged and incremental one (Bischoff, 2001: 276). SADC "is 
characterised by the state-centric approach to cooperation, little identification or 
participation, the persistence of national concerns over regional perspectives and lack 
of a means to commit to regional integration" (Bischoff, 2001: 276). This condition 
has been exacerbated by the fact that states' institutions and civil societies are 
accordingly weak and state power is, in the main, concentrated in the executive with 
loyalty directed toward the leading figure of the regime. Unlike in Europe, "armed 
forces are not concerned with creation of domestic order or protection of the 
population in general". Instead, they are instruments in the hands of a ruler used to 
coerce or threaten the opponents (Sorensen, 1997: 260). 
In contrast to SADC, the European Union (EU) regards common norms as the 
foundation rather than the outcome of institutionalised political and security 
cooperation. For example, "Central and Eastern European states would consequently 
not gain admission to the EU on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept 
democratic norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these 
norms" (Nathan, 2004: 16). In the light of this consideration, one can reasonably 
assume that the focus on states rather than democratic process within SADC, 
produces a different scenario altogether. 
With the above in mind, Southern Africa should not to lose track of the broader 
conception of security implied by the notion of a security community. While SADC's 
level of cooperation remains exclusively inter-governmental (Neethling, 2004: 2), one 
of the challenges facing the Southern African region under the auspices of SADC is to 
go beyond this state-centredness (Soderbaun, 200 I: 110), since this preoccupation 
impedes the region from becoming a security community. 
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To transcend a state-centred approach to security in Southern Africa, a constructivist7 
approach may best assist in the interrogation of regional security policies. It can help 
frame "issues that could perhaps lead towards a reconstituted understanding of 
Southern Africa" (Swatuk and Vale, 2001 :34-35), one beyond state-centrism. Viewed 
in this context, a constructivist approach to security community building offers an 
alternative conception which stands in stark contrast to the state-centric, neo-realist 
paradigm. It should be pointed out that by suggesting a new security structure for the 
region, one does not downplay state security, but rather suggests a more holistic 
approach that seeks to advance the notion of human security that takes people as 
referent objects of security. Human security is defined as a "shift in perspective or 
reorientation that takes people as its point of reference, rather than focusing 
exclusively on security of territories or governments" (Axworthy as quoted in 
Handingam, 2000: 155). Taking this broader constructivist approach to security into 
account, the intention here is to map out what is needed in Southern Africa to build a 
true security community. 
The objective of the thesis is to attempt to investigate the prospects of the region 
becoming a security community using a constructivist framework as a frame of 
reference. As such, Adler and Bamett' s analytical framework for studying the 
emergence of security communities organised around three ' tiers' is used. These tiers 
centre on the precipitating conditions, process variables and structural variables, 
mutual trust and collective identity (Adler, and Barnett, 1998: 17). The thesis tries to 
assess Adler' s criteria for the development of security communities and uses these to 
analyse the prospects and practices at play which could lead the SADC region at the 
threshold of a security community. Security communities require a liberal democratic 
environment characterised by a "significant economic interdependence and political 
pluralism" (Acharya, 1998: 198). Writes Adler, "members of...security communities 
hold dependable expectations of peaceful change not merely because they share just 
any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values and allow their 
societies to become interdependent ... democratic values, in tum, facilitate the creation 
of civil societies". which also promote community bonds and common identity and 
7 Wendt proposes constructivism to emphasise the social construction of identities and interests. The 
main concern here is the sociological issue bracketed by neo-realists and neo-liberals namely the issue 
of identity- and interest fonnation (Wendt, 1992: 397). 
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trust" (Adler quoted in Acharya, 1998: 198-199). Taking this into consideration, it is 
difficult to grapple with what SADC has become or is trying to do, unless we entrench 
this understanding in the concept ofa security community (Adler, 1998: 119). 
In the light of this, some writers from different scholarly persuasions have already 
written about the notion of a security community in Southern Africa. These include 
Ngoma (2003), (2004) and (2005), van Schalkwyk (2005), Booth and Vale (1995) 
Nathan (2004) Neethling (2004) and Zacarias (1998) who are cited in various parts of 
the thesis. As such, the study intends to add to the broader enquiry into debates 
regarding a security community building paradigm in the region. The term Southern 
Africa denotes countries under the Southern African Development Community8 
(SADC). The study will cover the period from the early 1970s to the present. 
The thesis is therefore structured as follows: Chapter One is the introductory part, 
which sets up a framework for approaching regional security using a constructivist 
theory of international relations. It seeks to propose a conceptual security architecture 
that accommodates an alternative set of regional interactions. 
Chapter Two covers different theoretical approaches in an attempt to examine 
different perspectives that account for the absence of war in international relations. 
These include realism, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism. 
Chapter Three explores the evolution of security in Southern Africa during the Cold 
War and the apartheid era. It brings to the fore the role played by the South Africa' s 
apartheid regime to influence the regional security architecture through economic 
inducements and destabilisation. The chapter also tries to explore the response by the 
FLS, which culminated in the formation of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADCC). The chapter ends by assessing the replacement of SADCC by 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
• SADC was formed in 1992 under the Treaty of Windhoek to replace the SADCC which was 
established in 1980 by the he majority-ruled Southern African states to promote economic development 
in Southern Africa and reduce economic dependence on Apartheid South Africa (Zacarias, 1998: 51). 
Countries in the SADC include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter Four focuses on the processes and prospects for the SADC region to become 
a security community, the institutional framework that these processes require, the 
diplomatic arrangements that culminated in the idea of the Association of Southern 
African States (AS AS), the formation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
(OPDS) and problems that paralysed its functional and institutional capacity. It also 
looks at the subsequent restructuring of the OPDS into the Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). 
Chapter Five makes an attempt to suggest a human security paradigm as part of a new 
security agenda for Southern Africa. Chapter Six forms the conclusion of the thesis 
drawn from the findings in the research. 
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2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONTENDING THEORIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
2.1 The concept of security 
To understand the concept of security and its value to Southern Africa, it is important 
to begin by painting a picture of the conceptions of security in international relations. 
Buzan argues that "security is an essentially contested concept" that includes several 
notable disagreements which indeed make it difficult to determine what is to be 
secured essentially (Buzan, 1991: IS). As used conceptually in international relations 
literature, the concept of security is based on two key realist assumptions: one that 
threats to state security primarily arise from outside its borders, and two, that these 
threats are mostly, if not entirely military in character, and generally need a military 
response if the security of the state is to be safeguarded (Ayoob, 1991: 261). 
However, a multiplicity of theoretical challenges to the realist paradigm brought about 
new definitions and prescriptions of security (Tickner, 1995: 178). Prominent among 
them is Ullman's fundamental liberal challenge to realist orthodoxy. Ullman argued 
for the trade-off between security and other values such as liberty. According to him 
"defining national security merely in military terms conveys a profoundly false image 
of reality". For Ullman, this causes states to prioritise military threats ignoring other 
more harmful dangers thus reducing their total security (Ullman, 1983: 29-133). 
Buzan also offers an extensive re-examination of security from a neo-realist 
perspective that attempts to transcend the military state-centred conception to include 
non-military dimensions (Tickner, 1995: 185). These include political, economic, 
societal and environmental dimensions9, which are mutually reinforcing and 
inextricably intertwined (Buzan, 1991: 19). Despite his expansion on the definition 
and use of security, Buzan does not rule out anarchy in the international system and 
does not believe the mere elimination of anarchy is the answer to the security 
dilemma (Tickner, 1995: 185). The concept of a security dilemma presupposes that in 
9 Buzan argues that political security is concerned with the organisational stability of states, their 
system of government and ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security relates to access to 
resources, fmance and markets needed to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal 
security concerns sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional language, 
culture and religiOUS and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the 
maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other 
human enterprises depend (Buzan, 1991: 19-20). 
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the course of providing their own security, measured by the accumulation of arms, 
states automatically stimulate the insecurity of others (Frederking, 2000: viii, Dunne, 
1997: 117). 
For Southern Africa, the application of these realist conceptions of regional security 
still creates "major conceptual problems" (Ayoob, 1991: 263). This is so because 
three major features of the concept of security as developed in the Western literature 
of international relations, including its external orientation, and its deep-seated 
linkage with systemic security and its binding ties with the two former East-West 
blocs are mostly not applicable (Ayoob, 1991: 263) in the Southern Africa context. In 
many respects, therefore, security in Southern Africa should be looked at from a point 
of view that differs to some extent from that of the Western literature10 of 
international relations (Ayoob, 1991: 265). 
To assist in our understanding of security in Southern Africa, Booth moves beyond 
Buzan's neo-realist conception and takes a critical position to argue that security 
should be viewed in the broader context of the sUbjugation of human rights, ethnic 
and religious rivalries, economic collapse and so on. He argues that failure to address 
these issues can provoke dangerous instability at the domestic level which, in turn, 
can aggravate tensions that lead to violence. As a result, Booth views security through 
the lens of emancipation and argues, "Emancipation is the freeing of people from 
those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying what they would 
freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with 
poverty, education, political oppression ... " (Booth, 1991: 319). In other words, Booth 
assumes that "human visions of security must start with individuals" (Tickner, 
1995:189). The appropriateness and fit of Booth's perspective to regional security in 
Southern Africa will be explored more fully later, but on the face of it, it seems that 
Booth's definition of security addresses most of the current security problems in 
Southern Africa. It is indeed viewed as the most appropriate for building sustainable 
peace in a region emerging from violent conflict. 
JO The major assumption is that security in the context of Southern AfTica "does not simply only refer 
to military dimensions, as often assumed in the Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole 
range of range of dimensions of state's existence which are already taken care of in a more-developed 
states, especially those of the West". This include the search for secure systems of food, health money 
and trade (Anzar and Moon quoted in Ayoob, 1991: 259). 
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2.2 Theoretical Perspectives Accounting for the Absence of War in 
International Relations 
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa provoked the re-examination of security policies in the Southern African 
region. For policy-makers in the region, the era created a far-reaching challenge to 
revisit the region's security architecture. The dynamics at play demonstrated that 
cooperation as opposed to competition held the key to a sustainable peace that could 
help transform the region in the direction of a security community. It is against this 
background that the study seeks to examine some of the prominent, but contending 
theories of international security. 
These theories, including realism, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and 
constructivism each produce a number of distinct accounts to explain the absence of 
war in the realm of international relations. Each begins its analysis from a particular 
assumption (Rosamond, 2000: 7-169). In doing so, they highlight the approaches in 
which Southern African policy-makers understand the region and mould their 
responses to pressing global, regional and national issues (Cilliers and Solomon, 
1996: 1). 
2.2.1 RealismIl 
The realists recognise that in the world of inevitable clashes of national interests, the 
only way to reduce such clashes and achieve cooperation is to guarantee the existence 
of a rough balance of power between states (Burchill, 1996: 71). The balance of 
power theory presupposes stability among states. It is the principal mechanism that 
checks the abuse of political and military predominance by powerful states (Dunne, 
1997: 117). As such, cooperation between states is guaranteed by the formation of 
alliances12. For realists, alliances are intended to balance the power of stronger states 
I I Realism is generally regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in international relations. 
Proponents of realism as an intellectual tool of thought range from classical to modern realists. 
Classical realists include Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, while modem realists are Carr and 
Morgenthau. Generally, all these argue that international politics are driven by the struggle for power, 
which is rooted in human nature . Moral issues such as justice and law have no place in the corridors of 
power, as such states should accept and adapt to changing power political configurations in world 
politics (Dunne, 1997: 113). 
12 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is rcgarded as one the most consistent alliances to 
emerge after the Second World War to counterbalance the perceived Soviet threat. As McCalla puts it, 
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against the weaker states. States form alliances because they are not "sufficiently 
strong to feel secure against a possible combination of opposing states" (Smith cited 
in Morgenthau, 1967:164). Within the alliance, the distribution of the benefits of 
cooperation reflects a complete mutuality (Morgenthau, 1967: 178). According to the 
balance of power theory, cooperative undertakings such as political-military alliances 
constitute self-help systems (Waltz as cited in Keohane, 1984: 62). Waltz defines a 
self-help system as a system in which "both central authority and collective security 
are absent" (Wendt, 1992: 292). As such, acts of cooperation result from the 
understanding that mutual interests are sufficient to allow states to overcome their 
suspicions of one another (Keohane, 1984). In this environment, a dominant state 
exercises its power to create and enforce institutional rules to sustain cooperation 
between states (Reus-Smit, 2001: 210; Keohane, 1984: 7). 
According to the realist school of thought, states' existence is dependent on the 
competition for power and security (Linklater, 1996: 93). The core objective of all 
states is survival. The maj or assumption is that no state can be relied upon to 
guarantee the survival (Dunne, 1997: 118-119) of other states. In consequence, 
realists assume that issues in world politics are led by questions of military security in 
which the "high politics" of military security dominates the "low politics" of 
economic and social affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24). By emphasising the 
military power and security of states as the most important, realists subordinate non-
military issues to military ones. 
As a result, the approach does not accommodate sustainable cooperation and offers 
little value for conceptualising peace in Southern Africa in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. Viewed in this context, realist theory is not sufficient for directing change 
towards a security community after 1994. In fact, "the very idea of a security 
community is profoundly subversive to the entire realist tradition" since it challenges 
the realist "belief in the necessity and inevitability of war" (Acharya, 1998: 200). As a 
consequence, the next section assesses what the neo-realist offers in terms of 
sustainable security for the region. 
"NATO contributed to a greater sense of Western European security and unity ... in response to the 
Soviet threat" (McCalla, 1996: 448). 
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2.2.2 Neo-realism13 
While neo-realists see issues of physical security as producing motivations for 
cooperation in the international system, they are also doubtful that cooperation 
between states in the international system is capable of mitigating anarchy. Instead, 
they see anarchy as the key determining feature in the distribution of power and 
material capabilities, measured in terms of the accumulation of arms (Smith, 1995: 
23; Wendt, 1995: 73; Sorensen, 1997: 254). They stress the centrality of relative gains 
for decision-makers when dealing with international cooperation (Smith, 1995: 23). 
But, states are unlikely to cooperate if one state gains more from that cooperation. 
This is because relative gains prevent them from gaining capabilities in terms of the 
accumulation of arms over others. As such, Buzan uses the concept of a security 
complex to explain this pattern of relations between states in the region. According to 
him, such patterns relate both to the distribution of power and historical relations of 
friendship and enmity among states. Here, states' interdependence with one another is 
often characterised by fear, rivalry and the mutual perceptions of threat (Buzan, 1998: 
12). 
Neo-realists do not regard distribution of power as an end in itself; instead they regard 
it as a useful means by which states attain a level of security. In this frame of analysis, 
states run the risk of having too little or too much of it. This results in a security 
dilemma in international relations, which occurs in the environment of mutual 
mistrust and suspicions between states. "In such conditions, a feeling of insecurity, 
deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete for 
ever more power in order to find more security" (Hertz, as quoted in Frederking, 
2000: 2). As a result, insecure states realise their security through self-help. This is 
environment in which states cannot take for granted that others will come to their 
I3 The emergence of neo-realism in the 19705 came as a response to criticisms levelled against traditional 
realism's rejection of economic forces (Burchill, 1996: 83). Waltz is regarded of onc of the key proponents of nco-
realism. What he termed neo-realism or structural realism essentially served as both a critique and the theoretical 
appraisal of realism "which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics" 
(Burchill, 1996: 83). As a critique, neo-realism rejects the realist notion of human nature as a driving force behind 
state actions and argues for a structure as "a new level of inquiry" in the international realm (Waltz, 1990: 32). 
This structure is constituted by anarchy and distribution of material capabilities measured in the accumulation of 
arms (Wendt, 1995: 73, Sorensen, 1997: 254). As a theoretical appraisal, neo-realism does not discount struggle 
for power in the international system. Instead, it offers a different interpretation of the structure as the unit of 
analysis (Waltz, 1990: 32). 
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defence and that "those who do not help themselves ... will lay themselves open to 
dangers" (Waltz 1979: 118). Any state that endeavours to attain complete security 
leaves all others in a system insecure, thereby providing a powerful incentive for an 
arms race and the balance of power (Dunne, 1997: 117). 
On the other hand, Buzan offers a refined version of neo-realism by stressing the 
multi-sectoral dimension of security that defines security not only in terms of the 
internal security of the state, but also in terms of political, economic, environmental 
and societal dimensions (Buzan, 1991: 19). Despite this broadened analysis, Buzan's 
security is still rooted in a framework (Tickner, 1995: 186) of anarchy. He argues, "A 
system of sovereign states is by definition politically structured as anarchy ... anarchy 
is thus a decentralised form of political order" (Buzan, 1991: 19-21). 
While the neo-realist intellectual tool of thought can be used to analyse the Southern 
African security situation during the Cold War and the apartheid era where the 
organising principle of cooperation revolved around anarchy, it offers little value as a 
vehicle for the achievement of sustainable security in Southern Africa after 1994. The 
theory is pessimistic about the creation of structures by group of states to ensure a 
stable peace among them (Ngoma, 2005: 16). While neo-realists see the "sources of 
change in world politics as shifts, often violent, in the distribution of power", this 
stands in stark contrast to the idea of a security community that represents the 
possibility of change being an essentially peaceful process (Acharya, 1998: 200). In 
fact, neo-realists view multilateral institutions such as SADC as holding a "false 
promise" for building a new foundation for security structures (Mearsheimer, 1994: 
7). As such, SADC, as an institution that encourages cooperative relationships 
between states in the region defies the neo-realist premise (Ngoma, 2005: 16). 
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2.2.3 Neo-liberal institutionalism14 
Neo-liberal institutionalists express optimism that cooperation and interdependence 
can exist under anarchy through the use of economic resources, and strongly believe 
that regimes and institutions can be established to define the meaning of state action 
(Keohane, 1989: 11). Krasner defines international regimes "as principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in 
a given issue area" (Krasner, 1982: 185). As Keohane puts it, "Regimes contribute to 
cooperation .. . by changing the context within which states make decisions". This 
makes it possible for govenunents to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with 
one another (Keohane, 1984: 13). In fact, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that 
patterns of cooperation and disagreement can be understood only in the context of 
institutions that help define to the meaning and importance of state action (Keohane, 
1989: 2-11). As such, prevailing institutional arrangements can affect state actions by 
influencing (Rosamond, 2000: 142) "the flow of information and opportunities to 
negotiate; the ability of govemments to monitor others' compliance and to implement 
their own commitments" (Keohane, 1989: 2). 
Neo-liberal institutionalists assert that states will enter into cooperative relations 
despite the fact that other states could gain more from that cooperation (Dunne, 1997: 
159). As Risse notes, in "international relations neo-liberal institutionalism or. .. 
regime analysis has convincingly shown that cooperation under anarchy is possible 
and that self-interested actors can achieve stable and enduring cooperation and 
overcome collective dilemmas" (Risse, 2000: 3-4). For example, in a security regime, 
states still consider each other as potential threats but, have made cooperative 
arrangements to reassure each other and reduce these threats (Buzan, 1998: 12). In 
other words, regimes enable the dynamics of the system to limit the freedom of its 
units; as a result their behaviour and the outcomes of their behaviour become 
predictable (Keohane, 1989: 8). 
14 Neo-liberal institutional its place more emphasis on subjects such as the impact of institutions on state 
action and about the causes of institutional change. According to neo-liberal institutionalists, the actors 
must have some mutual interest that brings potential gains from their cooperation (Keohane, 1989: 2). 
Keohane makes a clear distinction between neo-liberal institutionalism and the concept ofliberalism by 
identifYing liberalism as a belief to superiority of markets to state regulation of economy or a belief in 
the value of individual freedom (Keohane, 1989: 10). 
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Conceptually, neo-liberal institutionalism offers a limited understanding of 
sustainable peace and security for Southern Africa after 1994. Apart from its 
influence on cooperation and economic interdependence among states, the neo-liberal 
institutionalist perspective subscribes to the aspects of neo-realism "at least in so far 
as it accepts anarchy as a feature of international system" (Lawson, 2003: 82). In 
effect, the theory considers institutions as creatures of self-interested states that at 
most constrain choices and strategies. "Virtually ignored is the possibility that the 
effects of institutions reach deeper to the level of interests and identity" (Checkel, 
1998: 328). The "exclusion of shared identities by peoples in the region leads the 
theory to discount the notion of a security community "(Ngoma, 2005: 17) in its 
analysis. 
2.2.4 Constructivism 
From the late 1980s onwards, a constructivist turn in international relations gathered 
momentum. Factors that prompted this momentum included the pessimistic responses 
of neo-realist and neo-liberal world views to the rapidly changing global order and the 
end of the Cold War (Reus-Smit, 1996: iii). This period ushered in renewed interest 
in the study of international relations. Subjects such as norms, ideas, and identity 
formation attained currency within the scholarship of the discipline. The attention has 
been a focus for a new and potentially fruitful theoretical undertaking which provides 
a direct challenge to existing international relations theories (Sterling-Folker, 2000: 
97-98). The constructivists' contribution to the study on ideas in international 
relations comprises an emphasis on collective norms and understandings that make up 
the social identities of actors and define the basic rules of the game (Risse, 2000: 5). 
This enables cooperation between states to balance their behaviour and overcome 
these security dilemmas by establishing social networks (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 5-
6). 
First, constructivists assume that structures shape the behaviour of social and political 
actors, whether those be individuals or states. They contend that normative or 
ideational structures are as good as material structures (Reus-Smit, 2000: 217). 
Second, constructivists argue that understanding how non-material structures 
condition actors ' identities provides valuable insights because identities inform 
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interests, and in tum, actions (Reus-Smit, 2000: 217). As Wendt puts it, "identities are 
the basis of interests. Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry 
around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process 
of defining their situations" (Wendt, 1992: 398). Third, constructivists assume that 
agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Here, constructivists imply that while 
normative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of 
actors, such structures would not exist outside the well-informed practices of such 
actors (Reus-Smit, 200 I: 218). In that context human agents do not exist in parallel 
from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (Risse, 
2000: 5). 
In summary, while realism through its balance of power theory offers Southern Africa 
a conceptual understanding of security and cooperation during the period of the Cold 
War and that of apartheid system in South Africa, it cannot be used as a conceptual 
tool after 1994 because of its state-centred and militarist approach. Realists regard 
non-military issues such as economic and social affairs as secondary to state security 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24). By virtue of being preoccupied with the distribution of 
power and military capabilities, neo-realism stops short of making any significant 
positive contribution that strengthens the international "community between states 
and people" since "no importance is attached to the practical efforts of states to create 
new global norms" (Linklater, 1995: 256). While neo-liberal institutionalists offer 
some insight in terms of norms, regimes and institutions as forming an integral part of 
cooperative relations between states, their acceptance of anarchy is ultimately self-
defeating and prevents them from providing a scenario of sustainable security 
cooperation in the region. 
Because constructivism argues for the acknowledgement of social character in global 
politics whilst at the same time stressing the relevance of state identities and the 
sources of interests, it holds more conceptual clarity than others and can therefore 
most fully accommodate the notion a security community (Ngoma, 2005: 41). It thus 
holds substantial promise for understanding peace and cooperation in the region. 
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2.3 Conceptualising a Security Community 
Unlike the neo-realist state-centric conception, constructivist security theory 
essentially addresses the idea of security communities that can be used to analyse the 
Southern African security situation. This creative idea was first developed by Karl 
Deutsch in the 1950s to describe the North Atlantic region (Lawson, 2003 : 86). 
Deutsch called attention to the usefulness of shared understandings, norms and values 
that could develop among states (Lawson, 2003: 86). Considering the Deutschian 
intellectual outlook for security communities, it is important to look at the continued 
existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) even after the 
disappearance of the Cold War threat and then situate that understanding in the 
context of building a security community in Southern Africa. As for Southern Africa, 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe had, as early as 1997, stated that he anticipated the 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security developing "into a kind of North 
Atlantic Organisation Treaty for the region" (SouthScan, 1997: 258). 
2.3.1 The Emergence of Security Communities 
Adler and Barnett offer a holistic analytical framework for studying the emergence of 
security communities. This analytical framework explicitly situates them within the 
constructivist camp around which security communities are seen to evolve. The 
framework has been used to analyse how NATO evolved into a security community 
after the end of the Cold War, and this might help in analysing how SADC could 
follow a similar trend. The framework is essentially organised around three 'tiers'. 
The first tier is made up of precipitating conditions that give confidence to states to 
acquaint themselves with each other' s direction in order to coordinate their policies. 
This results from the change of threat perception to allow new interpretations of 
regional interaction (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 37-38). For example, the announcement 
in May 1990, by NATO's Military Committee that it no longer considered the 
Warsaw Pact as a threat to the Alliance is a case in point. This not only allowed 
NATO to confidently respond to changing strategic circumstances, it also gave 
confidence to its former adversaries to change their policies against NATO (McCalla, 
1996: 449). 
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The second tier comprises two elements, structural elements and process elements. 
Whereas structural elements include power and knowledge, process elements 
incorporate transactions, international organisations and social learning (Adler and 
Barnett, 1998: 29), Adler and Barnett conceive of power and knowledge as structural 
holders of a security community. They understand power "as an authority to 
determine shared meaning that constitutes the "we-feeling" and practices of states and 
conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it 
bestows on its members" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 39). NATO's power in 1990 was 
no longer interpreted as a threat by its former Eastern bloc adversaries; instead it 
allowed such adversaries to enjoy security and other benefits potentially associated 
with the community by seeking its membership and aligning their policies in the 
direction of NATO (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 40). This was precisely a product of 
knowledge constituted by shared meanings and understandings between NATO and 
the former Eastern bloc states. By making membership possible under specified 
conditions, NATO gained influence over the process of domestic transformation in 
these states (Flynn and Farrel, 1999: 505). Hence in the process all actors learned to 
"identify with each other and saw themselves as "we" bound by certain norms" 
(Wendt, 1997: 390). 
The strong and positive degree of mutual responsiveness between the first and the 
second tiers leads to the third tier, which entails the development of mutual trust and 
collective identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29). For NATO, the easing of tensions as 
a result of the systemic process encouraged collective identity formation and the 
attendant transnational convergence of domestic values (Wendt, 1997: 390). This 
relationship was "responsible for the production of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29) in the region. 
The evolution of (NATO) from the aliiance!S to a security community constitutes one 
of the most important developments in post-Cold War international security. Despite 
predictions of its disintegration from within by some neo-realist theorists, NATO has 
15 Alliances historically have their roots in ongoing conflicts and have generally confined their actions 
to military coordination and defensive preparation. They are generally formed in response to and their 
cohesion largely depends on the intensity and duration of that threat and a major cause of their 
disintegration may be the reduction or disappearance of the external threat against which they were 
initially formed (Holsti, Hoprnann, and Sullivan, quoted in McCalla, 1996: 450). "Neorealism then is 
the best place to start when considering alliance and alliance behaviour" (McCalla, 1996: 450) 
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come out as, perhaps, the most dominant institution in contemporary security relations 
(McCall, 1996: 454, Williams and Newnann, 2000: 357). From a constructivist view, 
NATO's fragmentation was unlikely, because of the shared democratic norms of 
member states. Most importantly, member states did not perceive each other as threats 
with the demise of the Cold War (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357). "While 
debates in the late 1980s often revolved around whether NATO would, could or 
should survive, they now centre around the implications of its centrality, and its 
current and possible future enlargement" (Williams and Newnarm, 2000: 357). 
The evolution of NATO has indeed become a central theme in a broader analysis of 
international security (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 358) and the emergence of 
security communities. This stands in stark contrast with the neo-realist scholars' claim 
that conceives of international institutions as holding out the false promise as new 
foundations for security structures, and of having minimal influence on state 
behaviour in upholding stability in the post-Cold War World (Mearsheimer, 1994: 7). 
Even neo-liberal institutionalist theorists dismiss these claims as "fallacies of logic of 
realism,,16 (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 40). To be sure, the persistence of NATO is 
indicative of the need for a deeper understanding of institutions and their ability to 
respond to changing strategic circumstances (McCalla, 1996: 446, Williams and 
NewnalUl, 2000: 357). Such an understanding would essentially provide a foundation 
for "concluding that international 'security communities' possess considerably more 
promise as a means of structuring security relations than neo-realism has traditionally 
allowed" (Adler, as cited in Williams and Neumann, 2000: 357). As a result, the 
concept of a security community appears to have attained currency in the 
contemporary world (Rosamond, 2000: 169). 
In the light of these considerations, brought about by the persistence of NATO, 
policy-makers and scholars of international relations are evoking the language of a 
community to understand international politics. Equally importarlt, many seasoned 
policy-makers and defence officials are marrying security to community in a new 
wave of emerging post-Cold War challenges to "conceptualise the possibility of 
16 Prominent neorealists like Mearsheimer forecast the decline of NATO by claiming that it was the 
Soviet threat that held NATO together. Taking that offensive threat would mean the abandonment of 
the Continent by the United States resulting in the disintegration of defensive alliance (Mearsheimer as 
cited in Keohane and Martin, 1995: 40). 
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peace". In many respects, therefore, security has become a condition and quality of 
communities wishing to dwell in pacific relations (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 4). 
2.3.2 Security Community and Integration 
Deutsch argues that "A security community is a group of people, which has become 
"integrated" through the attainment of a sense of a security, institutions and practices 
the result of which is dependable expectation of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957: 3). 
Here, integration, which Deutsch embraced, constitutes one of the defining properties 
of a security community's dependable expectation of peaceful change. It crops up at 
any given moment when states rule out the possibility of war (Adler, and Barnett, 
1998: 35). By implication, Deutsch integrates security with political and human 
aspects, thereby basing security on confidence and cooperation. This framework of 
analysis is important for Southern Africa since it elaborates the peaceful means of 
resolving disputes between states, the consolidation of democracy, and advancement 
human freedoms and rights (Leathelman cited in Adler, 1998: 132). As a result, 
integration is regarded as an important component for theorising security communities 
in the realm of international relations. 
While the concept of a security community is viewed as part of integration theory and 
a formula for conceptualising regional peace, it should be mentioned that a group of 
states cannot be integrated into the regional grouping without giving up their identities 
(Hodges, 1978: 237) to a supranational community. Comprehensive integration 
requires states to surrender part of their sovereignty. Viewed in Adler and Barnett's 
three tier analytical framework for security communities, surrendering sovereignty 
requires favourable conditions that give confidence to states to align their policies 
with those of others (Adler, and Barnett, 1999: 29). The European Union (EU) 
serves as the best example of a supranational body to which member states have 
surrendered part of their sovereignty to institutions of the Union. Article J.l of the 
Treaty of Maastricht that established the Union directs member states to ensure the 
conformity of their common national policies. To facilitate this, the EU had to 
develop "systemic structures and processes in the context of interaction" (Wendt, 
1997: 390). Whereas structures include norms and common values and resources, the 
process includes the spread of democratic institutions, and the concern for human 
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rights (Wendt, 1997: 390). These were accompanied by mutual trust and collective 
identity which are necessary conditions for community building and the dependable 
expectation of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 29). The development of 
mutual trust and collective identity in the EU region brought about closer economic 
and political cooperation in a region historically devastated by conflicts. Replacing 
national competition with cooperation and interdependence has lessoned acts of 
aggression and reciprocal retaliations (Burchill, 2001: 39). As a result, the expansion 
of transnational exchange coupled with the capacities of the Union to respond to the 
needs of those who exchange and the role of supranational rules shaped the resultant 
integration (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 4). With this in mind, one would reasonably 
assume that the EU has attained the level of a security community. 
2.3.3 Security Community and Southern Africa 
A security community is not only sought in the behaviour suggestive of the 
renunciation of military violence, it is also accompanied by "the existence of deeply 
entrenched habits for the peaceful resolution of conflicts" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 
35). As Booth and Vale remind us, the historical setting in Southern Africa had been 
antagonistic to the growth of processes for peaceful resolution of conflicts for the 
reason that the regional community emerged out of wars of destabilisation. Today, the 
key lies in the development of a widespread agenda among states in the region and 
such an agenda "needs the support of powerful community-based agents across the 
region" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 290). With these considerations in mind, a region can 
then place itself on the path towards a security community. 
2.3.4 Security Community Indicators 
Adler suggests six enabling conditions or indicators necessary for building a security 
community, which are closely related to the three tier analytical frarnework. These 
can be used as measuring tools in the case of Southern Africa because of their ability 
to measure the degree to which social forces within the relevant states mobilise, 
thereby changing the perceptions of both decision-makers and societies about their 
security (Vucetic, 200 I: 119). Non-state forces can play a part in raising people-
centred discourse and this include three critical roles such as increasing the 
accountability of the security sector, demanding change in the regional security 
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architecture, acting as a watchdog and providing technical input. This may serve as a 
source of pressure for states to soften up the notion of sovereignty and bring about a 
security community in the region. 
First, Adler introduces the concept of cooperative security 17 , which he refers to as a 
demilitarised form of security. He does so in order to integrate security with political 
and human dimensions. He does this by considering issues of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law not only as domestic issues, but also the core subjects 
of international commitments (Adler, 1998: 132). For Southern Africa, the idea of 
cooperative security emerges as a comprehensive approach that holds a key for 
changing the regional security architecture. While the regional security agenda in the 
past was characterised by wars of destabilisation accompanied by geo-strategic Cold 
War rivalry, today such an agenda is characterised by internally based non-military 
threats. In a way, the need for cooperative security in the region is premised on the 
understanding that these threats could surely impinge on the safety, cohesion and 
stability of individuals, communities, societies and even countries. By implication, it 
is by no means clear that they constitute a security threat or problems of national 
security (Lipschutz, 1995: 6). 
The Southern African region has not, as such, yet reached the level of cooperative 
security. Instead, the region can be characterised as a security regime because states 
are concerned with collective security in which they undertake "to join in common 
action against those which threaten the territorial integrity or political independence 
of others" (Evans and Newman, quoted in Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 193). In other 
words, Southern African states still exist "in the climate of anarchy" (Makoa, 
2004:100). 
In the second condition, states are expected to socialise and teach norms of conduct 
on the understanding that "what can bring them together are the norms and values 
they share" (McCalla, 1996: 464). These norms are internalised to the extent that 
17 By citing Learthennan, Adler defines cooperative security as a demilitarised fonn of security 
resulting from "imbuing security with political and human dimensions basing security on confidence 
and cooperation, the elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states, the 
consolidation of justice and democracy, in civil society and the advancement of human freedom and 
rights including the rights of the minority" (Leathennan as quoted in Adler, 1998 : 132). 
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different states picture themselves not as independent entities, but also as part of the 
broader community (Adler, 1998: 135). "Norms are standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of rights and obligations" (Krasner, 1982: 186). For instance, democratic 
regimes are based on political norms that call attention to regulated political 
competition through peaceful means (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 624). The best 
example of such regulatory mechanisms in Southern Africa is the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum!8, which has virtually been ignored. 
But, in general, Southern African states lack the ability to match their intentions with 
practice. This is a recipe for conflict in the region. Despite the adoption of the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum as a mechanism for the prevention of post-election conflict, 
political competition between parties has often been more violent, affected many 
people and dominated the thoughts of average persons in the street (Goyvaerts, 2000: 
30 I). These conflicts are mostly resolved through violence and coercion. The post-
election conflict in Lesotho in 1998, in which South Africa and Botswana intervened 
militarily and election-related violence in Zimbabwe in 2002 and in Malawi in 2004 
are cases in point. While military intervention may be inevitable in election related 
violence, this may portray a negative image of political culture and political norms 
that a region transmits to its environment (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625). 
The third condition involves expectations of international legitimacy and the 
accountability norm as an essential security community building mechanisms. Here 
legitimacy is measured in terms of the level of democratisation, whereas the 
accountability norm renders states accountable to one another and to the entire 
community for what they do to their own citizens (Adler, 1998: 135). Democratisation 
creates a climate of confidence since it is generally believed that democracies do not 
fight each other as norms of compromise and cooperation prevent them from doing so 
(Maoz and Russett, 1993: 624). Mutual accountability exists in the environment of 
confidence based on trust, peaceful change and collective identity and replaces the 
notion of non-intervention (Adler, 1998: 135). 
18 The provisions of Article 5 of the constitution of the SA DC Parliamentary Forum among others call 
for the promotion of principles of human rights and democracy and the encouragement of good 
governance, transparency and accountability within the SADC region. The Forum also institutionalises 
and strengthens electoral processes to foster the integrity of elections. 
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In the case of Southern Africa, the preoccupation with principles of sovereignty and 
non-interference suggests that "states remain free agents acting on the basis of their 
own preferences" (Adler, 1998: 127). As such they are at liberty to specialise in the 
pursuit of "their own interests without concern for developing the means of 
maintaining their identity and preserving their security in the presence of others" 
(Waltz, 1979: 104). In this view, states' internal affairs where gross human rights 
violations occur do not constitute a legitimate concern of the entire regional 
community (Adler, 1998: 127). Because SADC remains silent about non-democratic 
governments such as Swaziland and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, "there is no 
evidence to support the claim that states feel accountable to each other" (Vucetic, 
2001: 124). 
The fourth condition is the effective system of governance which considers 
constitutive norms and associated institutions and practices as a crude governance 
system. This is basically contingent upon compliance with transnational identity that 
creates and maintains public order (Adler, 1998: 134). The effective communication 
to advance transnational identity depends on institutions without which coordination 
of policies between states would be impossible. Institutions allow for governments to 
monitor each other' s compliance and to implement their own commitments (Keohane, 
1989: 5). While civil society actors playa significant role in this respect, the role of 
civil society is limited in the case of Southern Africa. The most fundamental locus of 
policy-making, implementation and monitoring in the region exclusively remains the 
preserve of governments. 
The fifth condition is the concept of a cognitive region in which states accrue benefits 
by constructing a regional identity. This community building practice encourages 
people to imagine that their security and well-being are inextricably intertwined in the 
sense that shared understandings and common identities are not restricted by borders. 
"This gives a new meaning to the idea of sovereignty within a security community" 
and promotes a shared understanding that states should not consider the sense of 
being insecure only when their authority is subjected to challenge or their survival is 
endangered, but also when the basic understandings that constitute the cornmunity are 
violated (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 135). 
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However, issues of xenophobia in Southern Africa, particularly in Botswana and 
South Africa have worked against the idea of a cognitive region and agent states. In 
both countries foreigners from Southern Africa and other African countries have 
become targets for hostility and violence (Harris, 2002: 1). Despite the transition from 
the apartheid system to democratic governance, prejudice and violence continue to 
mark contemporary South Africa. At glance, it appears that the shift in political power 
has brought new practices and victims. "One such victim is a foreigner" (Harris, 
2002: 1). "Contemporary public perceptions of xenophobia are echoed and 
influenced, largely through the press, by politicians and public officials". For 
example, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the then South African Minister of Home Affairs 
was quoted as saying "if we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce 
resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid 
goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme" (Harris, 2001: 49-50). 
In Botswana, thousands of Zimbabwean immigrants have not been treated humanely 
as the government has introduced new border controls and harsh punishments, "while 
levels of xenophobia are on the rise across the country where it was virtually 
unknown" (Lefko-Everett, 2004: 1). It could be argued that the insistence on the 
sanctity of borders and centrality of state sovereignty lend much credence to these 
xenophobic practices and work against the idea of a mutual identity in the SADC 
region. 
The abovementioned examples clearly demonstrate that mutual identification 
discourse is far from constituting extra-territorial relationships in Southern Africa. 
The concept of the 'we-feeling' suggested by the proponents of a security community 
does not apply in this context; instead notions of territoriality and sovereignty 
continue to define neighbours as the 'other'. While the era of global cooperation has 
brought with it a new set of responsibilities and obligations, such as human rights 
issues that lie well outside the parameters of traditional domestic constituency 
(Marden, 2001: 49), governments fear that the sanctity of sovereignty would be 
severely compromised if drawn into a supranational community such as SADC. In 
other words, the concept of sovereignty continues to characterise regional identity and 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the intergovernmental level of interaction to 
incorporate civil society actors. In a sense, it also becomes difficult for regional civil 
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society actors to expand the process of social learning throughout the region to 
develop shared meanings and understandings because for governments that may again 
amount to interference in the internal affairs of member states. 
Finally, practices such as community building devices offer a means of tackling 
specific problems such as early warning, conflict prevention and protection of human 
rights (Adler, 1998: 135). These might serve as an institutionalising mechanism for a 
new way of collectively defining regional solutions thereby arriving at new vested 
interests. It could also be aimed at grounding regional security on collective regional 
identity. In Southern Africa, this can best be achieved through dialogue, negotiation 
and consent-seeking initiatives characterised by the notion of preventive diplomacy 
(Adler and Barnett, 1998: 136), as opposed to the gunboat diplomacy19 which favours 
military interventions. While the SADC Treaty highlights the need for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, democracy, peace and security, the reality confronting the 
region is that of military solutions to conflicts. This has been underscored by the 
adoption of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003. However, by embracing the 
principles of unfettered sovereignty and non-interference and excluding civil society 
actors from its functions, the pact reproduces the logic of neo-realism and stands in 
stark contrast to the idea of a security community. As Sukma persuasively argues, "a 
security community is not a Defence Pact or a military alliance. A security 
community does not prescribe member states to commit their resources in defence .. .it 
seeks the creation of conducive and cooperative environment within which conflict 
would not occur in the first place" (Sukma, 2003: 3). Hurrell concurs that a 
meaningful security community "cannot rest on ... a stable balance of deterrent threats, 
nor on coming together in the face of external threat, all factors typically stressed by 
neo-realists" (Hurrell, 1998: 229). 
2.3.5 The Position 0/ Southern A/rica in relation to Adler's Criteria/or a Security 
Community Building 
Taking Adler' s six indicators for a security community building into consideration, 
Southern Africa does not meet any of the criteria. As a result, the region can 
reasonably be categorised as a security regime. This is the environment in which there 
19 In gunboat diplomacy, conflicts are usually solved by the use of force through military action. This 
was the case with the resolution of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho in 1998. 
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is a mutual fear and mistrust among states generated by the accumulation of arms. 
Given that regimes and regime theory are basically ascribed to neo-realism in which 
state security is what really matters, the Southern African security situation clearly 
reflects this state of affairs. Governments are in the main concerned about state 
security and not so much about human securitiO (Matlosa, 2000: 40, Neethling, 2004: 
2). In a security regime for example, "competitive arms acquisitions and contingency 
planning usually continue" (Acharya, 1998: 201). 
There is a multiplicity of events which indeed characterises Southern Africa as a 
security regime and generates fear amongst some states. In 1996, for example, 
Namibia blamed Botswana for provoking a Southern African arms race by its 
purchases of expensive military planes and tanks from Canada, Germany and Britain 
considered as a "largest arms build-up in Southern Africa" of the post apartheid era. 
Another dimension of fear was generated by the Botswana Defence Force's 
cooperation with the US military in the areas of training, medical infrastructure and 
military equipmenf l (SouthS can, 1996: 191). As a sign of constant cooperation, 
Botswana continued to conduct a string of military exercises with the units of the US 
armed forces in 1999 (SouthScan, 1999: 126). As a result, Namibia sought to boost its 
own military power with Russian arms purchases and by signing military cooperation 
agreement that would similarly assist the Namibian Defence Force with training and 
equipment (SouthScan, 1996: 191). 
Similarly, while Angola's military spending declined significantly in the early 1990s, 
by 1999, it reached the highest level of the decade and then declined in 2002. South 
Africa is the main exception with declining expenditure throughout the decade, which 
by 1999 was less than halfof 1989 (Indicator, 2002: 3). 
Another dimension has been added by the extent of rearmament in the region with 
Botswana and Zimbabwe increasing their defence expenditures between 2001 and 
20 For the definition of human security see Chapters One and Five. 
21 In 1996, the BOF received aid from the US military which included, $450,000 for training of BOF 
officers in the US, provided Botswana with 10 ambulances and the construction of a dental clinic in 
Gaborone; US airforce offered BOF two surplus C-130 cargo planes (SouthScan, 1996: J 9 J). 
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200222 (Ngoma, 2004: 419). The other SADC member states including Angola, South 
Africa and Namibia registered a decline of their defence expenditures in the same 
period23• The decrease in military spending is commendable because it reduces the 
possibility of war in the region. On the other hand, the increase in military 
expenditure generates a security dilemma since "reinforcing the security of one state 
through military build-up is likely to influence a corresponding decrease in the 
security of others ... it establishes the psychological necessity for escalating arms races 
and intensifies general insecurities", as seen between Namibia and Botswana. It also 
increases the possibility that conflicts, which might otherwise have been solved 
peacefully, might escalate into armed conflicts (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 193-
194). As Nkiwane puts it, "".establishing large military forces within each of the 
individual states are not sustainable routes to regional security" (Nkiwane, 1995: 2). 
Moreover, this rearmament challenges the tenets of a security community where states 
in a security community rule out the possibility of war by not targeting each other 
militarily; and where states cease to allocate resources for building military 
capabilities (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 194). 
Apart from the Namibia-Botswana issues, hopes for post-apartheid sustainable peace 
and security have been undermined by the continued level of instability in the region. 
These include human rights abuses in Zimbabwe; authoritarianism in Swaziland 
where political activities have been barred since 1973 (Maroleng, 2003: 46); civil war 
in the DRC where more than 2.25 million people have been forced to flee their 
homes, many of whom are beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies (Shah, 2003: 
I). Despite causing the humanitarian crisis, the "conflict has also been the scene of 
serious divisive policy among the states in SADC", especially "between those who 
support military intervention and those who do not" (Ngoma, 2005: 4). It could be 
argued that the degree of rearmament together with the level of instability defy the 
Deutschian notion of a security community and serve as a clear testimony that 
Southern Africa is not yet "integrated" and its "institutions and practices are not 
22 Between 2001 and 2002, Botswana increased its defence expenditure from US$184 million in 2001 
to US$254 million in 2002, while Zimbabwe increased its defence expenditure from US$287 million in 
2001 to US$637 million in 2002 (Ngoma, 2004: 419). 
23 Between 2001 and 2002, Angola decreased its defence expenditure from US$1458 billion in 2001 to 
US$946 billion in 2002, South Africa reduced defence expenditures registered US$1814 billion in 
200land US$1697 billion in 2002, while Namibia also decreased its defence expenditure from US$83 
billion in 200 I to US79 billion in 2002 (Ngoma, 2004: 419). 
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strong enough" to guarantee "peaceful change" among its population (Deutsch, 
quoted in Ngoma, 2005: 8). 
2.5.6 The Role of Extra-Regional Actors in Boosting Regional Security in 
Southern Africa 
Given the abovementioned situation, extra-regional actors such as the United Nations, 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the New Partnership for 
African Development's24 (NEPAD) African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) can 
play part in raising people-centred security policy that may be a source of pressure for 
states. Ngoma concurs that the drive towards security arrangements in the region is 
not exclusively determined by dynamics within the region alone. Other actors also 
influence the future developments (N goma, 2004: 418) that may lead to the 
attainment of a security community. 
Accordingly, the existence of such powerful actors who are able to project a sense of 
purpose offer the idea of progress and provide leadership around core issues (Adler 
and Barnett, 1998: 52). A number of examples, such the DRC conflict, clearly 
indicate that the failure of regional arrangements to come to grips with regional 
conflicts needs extra-regional actors. There are various reasons associated with these 
failures, ranging from "lack of resources skills and mechanisms, and inability to win 
the trust of parties to the conflict, to lack of regional solutions" (Zacarias, 1998: 58). 
For these reasons extra-regional actors can assume the role of brokers in a stalemate 
solution, as well as acting as arbiters. For instance, the UN arbiters such as the 
International Court of Justice amicably resolved the ensuing conflict between 
Botswana and Namibia in 1999 regarding the SedudulKasakili island dispute 
(International Court of Justice, 1999). The significance of this is that the Court 
prevented an escalation of the crisis that would have otherwise developed into a full-
scale conflict. 
24 The New Partnership for African Development is claimed to be a holistic integrated strategy for the 
socio-economic development of Africa, a plan premised on the common vision and tirm and shared 
conviction by African leaders to eradicate poverty and put their countries individually and collectively 
on a path of sustainable growth and development, thereby participating actively in the world economy 
and body politic. The programme advocates peace, security and political democracy as a benchmark of 
sustainable development (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001 :1). 
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Similarly, international donors such as the IMF and the World Bank have a significant 
role to play in the context of softening up state sovereignty, given that govemments 
have their own agendas and preoccupations, which are for the most part antagonistic 
to civil society actors (Zacarias, 1998: 58). Building a security community in 
Southern Africa requires strong civil society actors who interact effectively with the 
state as well as an agenda that takes people into account. The role of international 
donors in reinforcing civil society is equally important as they could provide funds for 
organisations inclined towards promoting peace, security, human rights and 
community development (Zacarias, 1998: 58). 
The NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism is also needed to soften the notion of 
sovereignty. According to Hope, the APRM is an Africa self-monitoring mechanism 
that involves a "systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state 
by other states, designated institutions or by a combination of states and designated 
institutions". This is done with the ultimate goal of assisting reviewed states to 
improve their policy-making and espouse best practices that are in compliance with 
the established standards, principles, codes and other agreed commitments (Hope, 
2002: 1). It "gives meaning to the practice of active socialisation and teaching of 
norms and provides members with knowledge necessary for imitation, that is, 
information and consultation about the workings of democracy and the rule of law" 
(Schimelfemig, quoted in Adler, 1998: 133). The APRM becomes appropriate in the 
Southern African context because it is a repository of the conditions for sustainable 
peace and security, economic and corporate governance, regional integration, 
capability and capacity to deliver public goods (Mokoena, 2003: 6). However, one 
ought not to lose the sight of the fact that APRM could be empowered to possess a 
supranational influence. At present, its institutional capacity is handicapped by the 
fact that it is voluntarily acceded to by member states. A question "that remains for 
southern Africa is whether the region can become a security community in any sense" 
(Booth and Vale, 1995: 290). The next chapter will make and attempt to bring this 
question into debate by placing the Southern African security dynamics in their 
historical context. 
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3. 0 EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Understanding the Dynamics of Security in Southern Africa 
It was mentioned in Chapter Two that neo-realism holds only little analytical value in 
plotting the Southern African security situation after 1994, particularly in tenns of 
transfonning the region into a security community. However, the neo-realist tool of 
thought is useful for analysing Southern African security dynamics before 1994. 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, Southern Africa was the scene of devastating conflicts 
"involving the white settler colonial regimes on the one hand and the majority-ruled 
states and liberation movements on the other" (Matlosa, 2001: 293). Among the most 
important factors was the South Africa's policy of regional aggression with a heavy 
dose of active superpower involvement (Matlosa, 2001: 293). 
In many respects therefore, the impact of the Cold War, the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, colonialism and the nationalist driving force towards independence bestowed 
a condition which disregarded human securit/5, with states being the primary 
security referents (Booth and Vale, 1995: 287). By and large, state security, as 
opposed to human security represented an integral part of the regional security 
architecture seeking to maintain Southern Africa at the centre of embattled geo-
strategic gains. It meant the "daily threats to the lives and the well-being of most 
people" that led only to brutalism and regional disorder (Booth and Vale, 1995: 287-
297, Booth, 1991: 318). These not withstanding, the period nurtured responses which 
held out hope for an eventual security community. It was marked by the fonnation of 
the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which sought 
to merge security with development and effectively neutralised South Africa's effort 
to exercise control in economic, political and military spheres in the region. As such, 
it may be reasonably assumed that all these occurrences lend themselves to the neo-
realist analysis. 
Correspondingly, Buzan provides a holistic neo-realist analytical framework that can 
be used to understand the Southern African security dynamics before 1994. He 
utilises the concepts of overlay, a security complex and a security regime to explain 
" For a broader definition of human security see Chapters One and Five. 
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both the hostile and friendly relations that exist between states in the region. First, an 
overlay defines a condition in which the presence of outside powers is strong enough 
to contain the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. The best 
examples of an overlay in Southern Africa were the colonial and white minority 
governments in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South West Africa (Buzan, 
1991 : 209). These were regarded as buffer states between the apartheid regime in 
South Africa and the majority-ruled states in Africa. 
Second, a security complex defines a group of states whose primary security concerns 
are closely interconnected to the extent that "their national security cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan, 1991: 190). The key 
components that constitute the basic structure of a security complex are patterns of 
enmity and amity existing between states in the region, coupled with the distribution 
of power among the principal states (Buzan, 1991: 2 II). The former reflects non-
cooperative relationships between states as a result of suspicion, fear and mistrust of 
one another, whereas the latter refers to evolving cooperation, which indicates the 
presence of trust (Snyder cited in Ngoma, 2005: 21). Given this situation, it could be 
argued that a security complex was the main feature of a regional security architecture 
in Southern Africa before the 1990s as a result of the "confrontation between and 
within South Africa and the Frontline black states" (Buzan, 1991: 205) of Southern 
Africa. 
Third, in relation to a security regime, states stilI consider each other as potential 
threats, but have made cooperative arrangements to reassure each other and reduce 
these threats (Buzan, 1998: 12). Regimes are social structures which contribute to the 
accomplishment of certain functions accompanied by explicit organisational 
arrangements. These arrangements relate to the activities of members of a regime 
taking place exclusively outside the jurisdictional boundaries of sovereign states 
(Young, 1982: 277). Without discounting anarchy, security regimes also lend 
themselves to neo-liberal institutionalist analysis, in which states are optimistic that 
developing institutions can help actors to achieve sustainable cooperation and 
alleviate conflict (Risse, 2000: 3-4). 
31 
Taking these analytical concepts of an overlay, a security complex and a security 
regime into consideration, it is equally important to highlight that the changing 
political situation in Southern Africa after 1974 meant major shifts from one pattern 
of security arrangement to another occurred and decisively destabilised the existing 
South African regional policy. The collapse ofthe Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974 
meant the break up of an overlay, thereby undermining South African regional 
policies sheltered under this arrangement. As a result of this break up, South Africa 
adopted aggressive policies towards its neighbours, exemplified by the invasion of 
Angola in 1975 (Johnson and Martin, 1986: xvii). In response to South Africa's 
aggressive policy, the Southern African states formed a coalition of Frontline States in 
1976 (FLS) as a political and military alliance26 to counteract the increasing security 
threat in the region (Jaster, 1985: 88). While the FLS trajectory seemed "consistent 
with the alliance formation" (Barnett, and Gause, 1998:), it appeared more resolved to 
resist the apartheid regime by establishing the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) to promote economic development among its 
member states and reduce economic dependence on South Africa (Zacarias, 1998: 
51). 
These community building practices encouraged the majority-ruled Southern African 
states to imagine that their security and well-being was a collective endeavour based 
on "shared understandings and common identities" (Adler, 1998: 135). With the 
beginning of the majority-centred security architecture that linked security with 
development, "cooperative security became a real possibility in which confidence 
building measures became not only a means for providing a temporary solution to 
regional instability, but also a matter of shaping regional identity" (Adler, 1998: 127-
128). It could be argued that these practices were aimed at propagating conditions that 
could help bring back peaceful coexistence and achieve a level of mutual trust that is 
"consistent with a security community" in the region (Adler, 128-129). 
The formation of SADCC speJt out one of the earliest markers towards a decline of a 
security complex in Southern Africa. Of critical importance to the region was a dire 
26 As McCalla puts it, alliances are generally formed in response to external threat and their cohesion 
largely depends on the intensity and duration of that threat. "The greater the threat or power to be 
balanced, the greater the cohesion of the alliance" (McCalla, 1996: 450-451). 
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need by SADCC member states for the attainment of a human-based security, but at 
the same time SADCC sought to neutralise the South African-led initiative, the 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) which was aimed at 
incorporating Southern African states into the South African economic system (Centre 
For African Studies, 1980: 105). Other key markers towards the decline of a security 
complex were the intensity of cooperation among peoples of the region in the defeat 
of the rulers of apartheid and this was most impressively obvious in the military 
defeat of the armed forces of apartheid at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in 1988 
(Campbell, 1997: 5). The South African military defeat was followed by the 
development of cordial relations between the US and the Soviet Union and the 
agreement on Namibian independence, which involved South Africa and Cuba in 
1988. In terms of this agreement, South Africa cooperated in bringing about the UN-
sponsored elections in 1989. The period was followed by the strategic withdrawal of 
the US and the Soviet Union from the region, which facilitated the withdrawal of 
Cuban and South African troops from Angola (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 123). This 
paved the way for the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the negotiated settlement 
in South Africa (Crocker, 1992: 485). The independence of Namibia and South 
Africa's negotiated settlement meant the decline of the regional security complex. 
The developments since the 1990s have brought Southern Africa to the threshold of a 
security community where regional states no longer expected or feared the use of 
force in their relations with each other (Bischoff, 200 I: 277). The era marked a 
condition in which regional security was no longer perceived through South Africa's 
policy of aggression, but rather by confidence and cooperation geared towards the 
peaceful settlement of disputes (Adler, 1998: 132). "This was preceded and followed 
by democratic elections in Angola, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, which 
heralded a new era of political liberal is at ion" (Bischoff, 2001: 277). 
3.2.1 Southern Africa as an Overlay and South Africa's Regional Policy before 
1974 
The evolutionary character of security in Southern African as both an overlay and a 
security complex is essentially interwoven with the role played by South Africa as the 
dominant military and economic power in the region. As Dzimba argues, it would be 
difficult to grapple with the evolutionary dynamics of security and development in the 
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region without mentioning the central position of South Africa (Dzimba, 1998: 2). By 
all accounts, the South African apartheid regime acted as a centripetal force around 
which all forms of insecurity in Southern Africa revolved. In other words, South 
Africa became and remained the main "fulcrum" in the definition of regional security 
(Mandaza, 1986: 129). 
Before 1974, the Southern African security situation may perhaps be explained in 
terms of an overlay. Two fundamental conditions underscore this explanation. First, in 
the early 1970s there were only a few independent Southern African states including 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia, which all had "so few 
capabilities" that their power projected "little, if at all" (Buzan, 1998: 12), against the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. The other reason for this was that Lesotho, Malawi 
and Swaziland had close political ties with South Africa, "although the former 
changed its foreign policy stance towards the apartheid regime in the 1970s" 
(Matlosa, 2001: 298). In other words, interaction among these states was not cohesive 
enough to generate a local security complex. The second condition was the direct 
presence of the white colonial and minority regimes in Angola, Mozambique, 
Rhodesia and South Africa. These regimes were "strong enough to suppress the 
normal operation of security dynamics among local states" (Buzan et ai, 1998: 12). 
Viewed in this context, the suppression made it easy for South Africa to enJoy 
unmatched domination in political, economic and military issues in the region. 
The general feeling which saturated the domestic and foreign policy of Pretoria was 
its unswerving antagonism to the decolonisation process (Nolutshungu, 1975: 7). 
Pretoria's regional policy concern was an attempt to both prevent struggles against 
colonial regimes in the region and to isolate the national liberation struggle inside 
South Africa from potential support by neighbouring states (Davies and O'Meara, 
1985: 186). This was made possible by an overlay that prevented states in the region 
from effectively challenging the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
Basically, the white minority community in South Africa was determined to maintain 
an overlay and fearful of, and opposed to the collapse of the colonial empires 
(Nolutshungu 1975: 6) in Mozambique, Rhodesia and Angola. The main fear of the 
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collapse of these empires was that they might provide a preliminary momentum for 
the African nationalists within South Africa itself. The other expectation was that, 
with the collapse of these empires, the emerging African governments would be 
hostile to white South Africa (Nolutshungu, 1975: 7). As such, the apartheid regime 
was determined to support the existence of a number of buffer states that surrounded 
it. In the west was the Portuguese colony of Angola and the South African occupied 
territory of South West Africa. In the centre lay the settler-ruled British colony of 
Rhodesia while in the east was the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. South Africa's 
regional policy was, for the most part, aimed at strengthening these buffer states so 
that they could continue to serve as a protective shield for its survival (Davies and 
O'Meara, 1985: 186). As a result, Pretoria provided these colonial white minority 
regimes with material assistance from the mid-1960s onwards. Pretoria's policies 
were basically aimed at creating an ideological and organisational environment that 
would be more favourable to the white minority regimes (Nolutshungu, 1975: 7). 
Over and above consolidating relations with colonial and minority regimes, South 
Africa conceptualised what was known as an 'outward looking policy' in mid-1967 as 
a foreign policy objective, in an attempt to cultivate opportunities of cooperation and 
cordial relations with willing African states (Nolutshungu, 1975: 114). While the 
name given to this policy objective changed over time, its basic content remained 
reasonably constant (Leys and Tontensen, 1982: 65). For example, in the 1970s it was 
called detente or dialogue and incorporated offers of economic cooperation including 
trade and aid to African states as a reward to those who were more cooperative27 
(Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 188; Jaster, 1985: 54). 
The key idea behind the detente was to look for support from potential allies from 
within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), more specifically in the Southern 
African region (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 188). As a result, the South African 
government managed to solicit support in the West African region. It established 
27 In 1968, South Africa established a five-million-rand fund for low interest loans to friendly African 
countries, as well as organising a technical assistance programme. South Africa renegotiated the 
Customs Union agreement with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1969, thereby giving the three 
smaller member states free access to the South African market and simultaneously making them more 
profoundly dependent on the dominant partner (Jaster, 1985: 54). 
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relations with Ivory Coast, which in tum opposed the African policies toward South 
Africa in support of detente (Nolutshungu, 1975: 269). In Southern Africa, both the 
outward policies and detente had a minimal success, as Malawi became the only 
African state to agree with the policy exemplified by the establishment of diplomatic 
ties with Pretoria. The major black response to the outward policy was influenced by 
the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 in which 13 African states strongly opposed any 
compromise with the apartheid and called for the liberation of Southern Africa (Jaster, 
1985: 54). The Lusaka Manifesto was the product of the deteriorating political 
situation in South Africa in the mid-1960s, the unilateral declaration of independence 
by Ian Smith in Rhodesia and the ongoing refusal of the Portuguese in Angola and 
Mozambique to compromise. This manifesto was later approved by the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) and committed states to support 
the liberation struggle until its logical conclusion (Matiosa, 2001: 399). The resolve 
to resist colonial regimes and apartheid dealt a mortal blow to both the outward the 
looking policy and detente, thereby undermining South Africa's policies in the region. 
3.3 The Breaking Up of an Overlay, and the rise of a Security Complex in 
Southern Africa 
The collapse of the Portuguese regime in 1974 constituted a major setback for South 
Africa. It culminated in the break up of an overlay under which apartheid South 
Africa had been sheltered and signified the formation of a security complex. The key 
feature defining the complex in the making was a high level of fear and suspicion felt 
mutually among the majority-ruled states and the apartheid regime. This served as a 
catalyst for many dramatic changes that transformed the security and political 
landscape in the Southern African region (Silke and Schrire, 1997: 4, Dzimba, 1998: 
8). The most important changes were seen at the level of the regional power structure 
resulting from the independence of Mozambique and Angola. This posed a 
fundamental threat to South Africa's policy-makers and further deepened mutual 
mistrust in the region. The threat emanated from the installation of governments 
formed by liberation movements namely, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(FRELlMO) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Price, 
1984: 11). 
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According to Chan, what exacerbated South Africa's fear was the fact that FRELIMO 
and MPLA were not only black-led, but had communist party structures which 
espoused the Marxist ideology. They had international communist support, which in 
the case of Angola included military support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. These 
countries became a symbol of a comprehensive challenge to South African ideology, 
policy and military superiority. The challenge was taken up in view of their success in 
integrating armed resistance, communistic structures and ideology (Chan, 1990: 25). 
What was more unsettling to South Africa was the fact that Mozambique and Angola 
occupied what South Africa regarded as strategic positions in the region. They both 
controlled coastlines immediately north of South African waters and above all both 
provided access to the sea for Southern African landlocked states (Chan, 1990: 25). 
The independence of Angola and Mozambique shifted the regional balance of power 
away from South Africa, accordingly undermining its regional policies. The collapse 
of what had been buffer states also shook the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia that 
represented the third and last bastion of white minority rule in Southern Africa. The 
Smith regime was put under substantial pressure as a result of facilities made 
available by FRELIMO to the Rhodesian liberation movements: the Zimbabwe 
African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwe African 
Peoples Union- Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF). On the Angolan side, there was also 
another mounting pressure from the South West African People's Organisation 
(SW APO) that was fighting for the independence of Namibia operating out of the 
southern part of the Angolan border area (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 188). 
To counteract the growing wave of resistance in Southern Africa, the apartheid 
regime sought to cultivate Western support, particularly from the United States. At the 
same time, the US had economic, political and strategic interests in Southern Africa. 
To all intents and purposes, it was determined to cooperate with allies and friends to 
deter its adversary: the Soviet Union (Mandaza, 1986: 128). Bischoff argues that 
"during the course of the 1970s, the conflict in Southern Africa had been 
internationalised and the United States had, after 1975, come to play an increasingly 
important political and diplomatic role as regards apartheid South Africa" (Bischoff, 
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1990: 259). By and large, South Africa wanted to assert itself as a dominant partner of 
the West to consolidate and perpetuate its apartheid policies. Correspondingly, it 
portrayed itself as a natural guardian of Western interests in the region (Chan, 1990: 
23). As a result, South Africa invaded Angola in 1975 and offered assistance to the 
Angolan National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) "insurgents with 
military supplies, logistical support, and backing in the field by its own forces" (Price, 
1984: 18). 
While military actions were conducted under the pretext of curbing SW APO 
incursions and operations into the Namibian territory (Price, 1984: 18), in reality, they 
were primarily meant to keep out the MPLA, which had close ties to the Soviet Union 
after taking over power. In essence, these attempts did not succeed as the defeat and 
repulsion of South African troops in Angola in 1976 coupled with the anti-apartheid 
Soweto riots proved to be a turning point for the apartheid regime in South Africa 
(Matlosa, 2001: 401). By the end of 1976, the South African regional policy had 
completely collapsed and the apartheid regime faced an internal crisis (Johnson and 
Martin, 1986: xvii). This internal crisis marked the beginning of a considerable 
change in the regional security architecture. It indeed heralded a transitional phase 
between 1974 and 1979 that gave rise to the development of a regional security 
complex. 
This transitional phase from an overlay to a security complex was highlighted by 
three fundamental events. The first one was the South Africa's invasion of Angola in 
1975, the second one was the growing internal crises in South Africa itself and the 
brutal suppression of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, while the third one was the 
formulation of a Total Strategy as a new South African policy framework with its own 
economic, political and military implications (Johnson and Martin, 1986: xvii). 
A completely new dimension to the complex was added when the Soviets and the 
Cubans intervened militarily in 1975 in support of the Angolan government (Crocker, 
1994: 35). Henceforth, Southern African became a sphere of contestation of global 
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union motivated by ideological and 
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military rivalries (Crocker, 1992: 410). It is this deteriorating security situation which 
consolidated the existence of a security complex. This can be traced by "how states' 
fears" shaped their "foreign policy and military behaviour" (Buzan, 1991 : 192). 
Gutteridge writes, "These events .. . brought home to white leadership the need for a 
new strategy. The so-called total strategy which emerged rests on the twin pillars of 
maintaining security by conventional military means ... " (Gutteridge, 1995: 2). 
3.4 Southern Africa as a Security Complex and the Adoption of Total 
Strategy as a Policy Framework by the Apartheid South Africa 
The adoption of Total Strategy by the South African government as its policy 
objective signified the escalation the level of insecurity in the region. The strategy 
was founded on two strategic objectives which involved a proactive and destructive 
part including 'techniques of persuasion' on the one hand, and techniques of coercion' 
on the other. The former involved offering assistance through aid and cooperation in 
the joint infrastructural projects to states willing to collaborate with South Africa 
(Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 195). The most visible example of economic cooperation 
involved efforts to establish the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSASi8 
initiative in 1978 (Ngoma, 2005: 90). The latter manifested itself through acts of 
destabilisation including punitive measures against states which were deemed 
uncooperative by the apartheid regime. These included surcharging export goods from 
neighbouring states; limiting or even banning imported labour from such states 
(Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 195), as well as direct military action. 
The strategy was transformed into state policy after P.W. Botha's ascendance to 
power in 1978. As a result, South African foreign policy issues were brought under 
the Committee of National Security, known as the State Security Council (SSC), 
dominated by military strategists. This covered a wide spectrum of internal and 
external activities of the government. Practically, the SSC's primary concern was the 
management of the total range of policy strategies of the state (Davies and O'Meara, 
"The Constellation of Southern African States was meant to lock Pretoria's neighbours more firmly 
into the South African economic system. This would increase Pretoria's influence over its neighbours, 
and thus prevent these states from assisting the South African liberation movements (Price, 1984: 15). 
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1985: 192-193). This involved the militarisation of the South African state and the 
emergence of the South African military as a major authoritative instrument in policy-
making (Jaster, 1985: x). It meant the large-scale mobilisation of economic, political, 
ideological, socio-psychological, as well as military resources of the state against its 
perceived enemies (Davies and O'Meara, 1984: 69). It was indeed a "national 
reorientation aimed at survival" (Cutteridge, 1981: 18) of a white minority regime. 
Pretoria was determined to replace the lost buffer states of formerly white minority 
ruled allies. These buffer states "had enhanced the stability of the white minority 
regimes, and by extrapolation enhanced the stability of South Africa" (Vale, 1990: 
173). The strategy was held up by the apartheid state as a justifiable step to 'Total 
Onslaught' against South Africa. Total Onslaught was defined as a threat to the South 
African government not only arising from among its own black majority population, 
but also from the Soviet-led communist conspiracy through regional govermnents 
(Dzimba, 1998: 1). On the part of the Southern African majority ruled-states, this total 
strategy not only produced the a high level of hwnan insecurity in the region, but also 
deepened cooperation through collective perceptions of identity based on the 
elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states (Adler, 1998: 
132). 
3.4.1 The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) 
Although the CONSAS proposal was meant to promote a number of joint economic 
projects between South Africa and other regional states, it was not "founded on the 
compatibility of shared values of its members". In fact, apartheid heightened the 
existence of diverse values "between South Africa and its partners by discouraging 
political links, a greater mobility of people and the development of strong institutional 
relations. Political unity with the rest of Africa was contrary to the philosophy of 
apartheid" (Zacarias, 1998: 46). South Africa recognised four significant gains with 
regard to the constellation policy to legitimise its internal policies. First, it was 
envisaged that the formation of the constellation would use economic inducements of 
development to assimilate neighbouring states strongly into the South African 
economic system (Centre For African Studies, 1980: 105, Price, 1984: 12). Second, 
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the constellation was to include independent Bantustans as members, and strengthen 
the apartheid state as a result of members' recognition of the sovereignty and 
independence of the South African homelands. Here, the intention was to give 
intemational legitimacy to South Africa's policy of separate development. Third, the 
constellation was also aimed at breaking African wlity by dividing the countries of 
tropical Africa on the issue of their relations with Pretoria (Centre For African 
Studies, 1980: 105, Price, 1984: 12). This was aimed at weakening the coordination of 
support for black liberation movements. Finally, with African states strongly divided 
over the issue of South Africa, "Western countries and their international firms would 
find themselves under less pressure to show their opposition to minority rule in South 
Africa" (Price, 1984: 15). Seen in this way, the constellation was explicitly intended 
to consolidate the position of the white minority regime in South Africa. 
The idea of CONSAS did not become feasible in part because the Southern African 
states "viewed it as a vehicle for intervention and assertion of South African regional 
hegemony" (Du Plessis, 1997: 23). In response, the FLS coordinated a more 
comprehensive politico-military strategy against South Africa, which effectively 
developed into consolidated and intense opposition to CONSAS. This neutralisation 
of CONSAS constituted a positive step along the way towards a security community 
building by establishing the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 
1980. In fact, "the first attempt at building a community of security, based on shared 
common principles, came with the creation of SADCC" (Zacarias, 1998: 46). While 
CONSAS was seen by Pretoria as a means for Africa to recognise the position of its 
homeland system, these developments only reduced it to a functional organisation 
between South Africa and the so-called independent homelands (Du Plessis, 1997: 
23). 
3.4.2 The Frontline States (FLS) 
The FLS constituted one of the powerful opposition to the white minority rule in 
Southern Africa in the territories of Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa. 
Essentially, a group of Southern African states including Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia formed a coalition known as the Front-Line 
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States (FLS) in 1976 (Jaster, 1985: 88). The FLS represented a forum for discussion 
of political and military problems inherent among the newly independent states and 
liberation movements (Cilliers, as cited in Motlosa, 200 I: 299). It constituted the 
region's loose military alliance opposing South Africa (Matlosa, 2001: 399) . This was 
so because "South Africa was determined to keep at bay the winds of change that 
were sweeping through the continent by consciously attempting to destabilise 
neighbouring "liberated" states" (Nkiwane, 1995: I). As such, the FLS was catalysed 
by a strong desire to unite the Southern Africa states in response to the apartheid 
threat. 
Although lacking a common and cohesive ideology, the FLS was strongly united by 
the members ' commitment to the process of decolonisation and their objection to the 
apartheid system (Matlosa, 200 I: 399). The coalition sought to bring unity to 
liberation movements, and collectively engage as a group in regional security issues 
(Jaster, 1985: 88). As such, the key commitment to independence and majority rule 
for the remaining white dominated territories quickly became the single great unifYing 
force within the coalition (Jaster, 1985: 89). It could be argued that with this sense of 
togetherness the FLS leaders were intent on creating a sense of a community that 
generates "cooperative relationships" based on collective identity (Ngoma, 2005: 42). 
As mentioned above, the Frontline States established SADCC as a neutral ising 
mechanism to counteract the ambitions of South Africa in the region. By merging 
security with development and generating a common identity to advocate "peaceful 
change", the FLS exhibited some characteristics of a security community. Given the 
similarities among the FLS member states "and their common security agenda, more 
progress in community building" became visible. In short, while Southern African 
leaders established the FLS "for statist purposes, its very existence has 
encouraged ... greater mutual identification" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 162) at 
regional level and indeed highlighted certain features of the emergence of security 
communities. 
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3.4.3 The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
The fonnation of the SADCC and neutralisation of CONSAS not only obstructed 
Pretoria's efforts to shape the pattern of regional relations, it also propelled South 
Africa to embark on the extensive campaign of destabilisation in the region. In that 
regard, destabilisation represented a decisive element in the general policy of Total 
Strategy (Dzimba, 1998: 1). "The creation ofSADCC was founded on the principle of 
emancipation and equity, regarded by the leaders of Southern Africa as necessary 
condition to reduce conflict, and promote stability and prosperity" (Zacarias, 1998: 
52). The SADCC became the important centre for political, diplomatic and economic 
relations between the region and the external world; it was able to uphold a strong 
sense of political solidarity among its members (Zacarias, 1998: 53). 
SADCC recognised that the reduction of dependence on South Africa was the only 
way to interweave a fabric of regional cooperation and development (Masire, as cited 
in Green, 1981:183). It became apparent that "South Africa's economic and political 
hegemony in the region could no longer be taken as historical given" (Rich, 1994: 
13). With the fonnation of the SADCC, the FLS provided a profound linkage between 
security and development. Born out of the Lusaka Declaration, the inauguration of 
SADCC endowed the post-independence Southern African states with their first 
platfonn for economic cooperation (Ie Pere and Tjonneland, 2005: 4). This 
cooperative undertaking was premised on four objectives. First, it was intended to 
reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Second, it was aimed at promoting 
cooperation between the states in the region. Third, it was to mobilise resources in 
order to carry out national and international projects. Finally, it was to cooperate with 
aid organisations in order to secure technical and financial assistance (Leys and 
Tostensen, 1992: 53). 
The SADCC project was not only a direct challenge to CONSAS, but it was also a 
challenge to one of the more immediately evolving objectives of South African 
regional policy. South Africa's intention to maintain and strengthen economic ties 
with states in the region was thwarted. Hence, the "establishment of SADCC and the 
accession to it of all the key target states of the constellation project represented an 
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important defeat for South Africa's strategy" (Davies and O'Meara, 1985 : 197). With 
the formation of SADee and the paralysis of eONSAS, South Africa was 
strategically disarmed; the only alternative left at its disposal was to resort to 
destabilisation tactics because economic incentives could not work. 
3.4.4 Destabilisation - Human and Material costs 
Following the neutralisation of eONSAS in the late 1970s, the South African 
strategists started the campaign of destabilisation "that left more than a million of the 
region's people dead and is estimated to have cost $62.42 million" (Booth and Vale, 
1995: 286). The era obviously marked a high level of human insecurity in the region 
and the large-scale destruction of property. The most remarkable events were the acts 
of economic sabotage and the promotion of insurgency, which formed the core of 
human insecurity. The economic sabotage focussed on the targets such as bridges, 
dams, railways and the cost of this policy to the target states was very high (Green 
and Thompson, 1986: 251). The insurgency strategy started with the govermnents in 
Angola and Mozambique, through training, arming and supporting guerrilla groups in 
each country to carry out the work of destabilisation (Marishane, 1992: 2). For 
example, South Africa trained, directed and supplied the Mozambique National 
Resistance (RENAMO) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola 
UNIT A with weapons. While the insurgents inflicted heavy human costs, "the people 
who have lost their homes, who have been terrorised ... who have been bereaved or left 
to care for the disabled family members ... all this suffering is unaccounted for" 
(Nyerere, 1986: ix). While this era represented the height of a security complex in the 
region in which fear, enmity and mutual mistrust characterised relations between the 
white minority regime in South Africa and the black majority-ruled states, this level 
of human insecurity also spelt out the beginning of an unwavering endeavour to form 
a security community by creating a conscientious resistance against the regime. 
The escalation of military action directed against uncooperative neighbouring states 
accompanied by the disregard for human life continued from 1981 onwards. For 
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example, there were large-scale invasions of Angolan territories29; an attack against 
ANC residences in Matola near Maputo in Mozambique; a substantial increase in the 
level of activities by South African sponsored dissident30 groups, namely the 
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) 
(Price 1984: 18-19, Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 198). South Africa also trained and 
armed the Super-ZAPU dissidents in Zimbabwe (Dzimba, 1998: 59), as well as 
dissidents to destabilise Zambia (Jaster, 1985: 146). 
In its campaign of destabilisation, the South Africa's apartheid regime divided the 
Southern African states into three categories. The first included more conservative 
states which were perceived to be real or prospective collaborators, such as Malawi 
and Swaziland. The second consisted of those considered to be more vulnerable to 
pressure: Botswana and Lesotho; while the third comprised states whose political 
systems were seen to constitute the most fundanlental challenge to South African 
capitalism (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 199) such as Angola, Mozambique, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
As a form of incentive, the first category was rewarded for' good behaviour' , which 
involved the expansion of economic links with South Africa. Swaziland is regarded as 
the most outstanding example of this category. Because of its cooperation with South 
Africa, it was indeed rewarded with the construction of a railway line through Swazi 
territory linking the Eastern Transvaal with Richards Bay on the Natal Coast (Davies 
and O'Meara, 1985: 199). The reason for this cooperative behaviour is not hard to 
fathom. Swaziland had entered into a secret security pace I with the apartheid regime 
by early 1982 (Bischoff, 1990: 430). States in the second and third categories were 
29 Operation Protea launched by the SADF on August 1981 constituted one of the massive invasions of 
southern Angola in which 11000 men were involved. After massive bombing raids on the main urban 
centres in Cunene province, three South African Armed columns entered the country and moved on the 
where they engaged the Angolan armed forces (Holness, 1986: 99). 
30 In this context, the term dissident is used to defme groups who rebelled against established 
governments in Southern Africa. These groups were trained, armed and given financial support by the 
apartheid regime in South Africa and were used as instruments of destabilisation. 
31 This agreement allowed Pretoria to define security matters in its relations with Swaziland in the 
broadest possible terms. In that context, Swaziland acknowledged that both governments were 
threatened by international terrorism in all its manifestations that posed the real threat to the peace and 
security of the region. As a result, Swaziland agreed to undertake to combat terrorist insurgency and 
subversion on its own and together with states wherever possible (Bischoff, 1990: 430). 
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earmarked for intensified destabilisation because they had rejected cooperation with 
South Africa. These states included Lesotho, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
Zambia and Botswana. Throughout 1982 and 1983, destabilisation was the most 
visible form of South Africa's aggression in the region (Geldenhuys, 1995: 49, Davies 
and O'Meara, 1985: 199). Despite, this calculated aggression; Southern African 
majority ruled "made some modest moves toward a deepening of interstate 
cooperation" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 163). 
3.4.4.1 Lesotho 
For Lesotho, there were two fundamental reasons for destabilisation. The first one 
was to force the government to crack down and expel refugees especially, African 
National Congress (ANC) members. Pretoria accused Lesotho of acting as a 
springboard from which the ANC military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe was launching its 
attacks on South Africa (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 145). Second, Pretoria wanted 
Lesotho to establish diplomatic relations with the Transkei Bantustan to give credence 
and legitimacy to its homeland policies. When the Lesotho government refused to 
accept these demands, there was a dramatic increase in acts of destabilisation in the 
form of armed action32 by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) supported by South 
Africa (Ajulu and Cammack: 1986: 144-145). 
In addition to using the LLA as a proxy force, the South African government also 
started to directly attack Lesotho. In December 1982, the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) launched a large-scale cross-border raid against members of the ANC 
in the capital, Maseru, killing 42 people: 12 Basotho and thirty ANC members, who 
included women and children (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 140, Matlosa, 2001: 85). 
In the same period, Lesotho was subjected to economic coercion in the form of 
restrictions of the movement of goods and people across its border with South Africa. 
Threats were also made to repatriate the Basotho migrant workers in South Africa, 
who constituted the largest single source of foreign exchange (Matlosa, 2001: 86). 
32 The LLA embarked on the campaign of sabotage and assassinations and its main targets were 
tourism industry and government officials. According to Davies and O'Meara, the most conspicuous 
actions were explosions in the lUXUry Hilton Hotel in the capital Maseru in which several people were 
killed. There was also an attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan in a car bomb in 
August, 1983 (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 200). 
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In December 1985, South Africa launched another military raid in Maseru, killing 12 
people who once again included ANC members and Lesotho citizens. This heightened 
focus on Lesotho was the result of that country's refusal to sign an Nkomati style non-
aggression pact with South Africa and its increased ties with Eastern Bloc countries 
such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 146). 
This was followed by a total border blockade which precipitated the 1986 military 
coup that ousted Chief Leabua Jonathan. As it turned out, the military regime, headed 
by Major-General Metsing Lekhanya, "was to all intents and purposes a close ally of 
the Pretoria regime hence the signing of security pacts between two governments" 
(Matlosa, 2001 : 86). With this in mind, one would argue that South African did 
achieve its goal of destabilising Lesotho. 
3.4.4.2 Angola 
Angola is endowed with considerable mineral wealth and economic potential; it is the 
state in the region whose economy was least dependent on South Africa. However, 
like many Southern African states, it was earmarked for destabilisation because of its 
anti-apartheid policies. Destabilisation brought about economic and human costs. 
Economic costs of war included acts of sabotage directed against oil pipelines, water 
and electricity. Over and above this, the sabotage of the Benguela railway negatively 
affected Angolan exports from the interior to the sea coast. The lucrative diamond 
industry was damaged by UNIT A attacks directly backed by South Africa and 
agricultural activities were disrupted (Gunn, 1987: 59-60). Argues Holness, "the war 
disrupting agriculture and transport, also led to increased foreign exchange 
expenditure in food imports" (Holness, 1986: 100). On May 15 1986, at the meeting 
of aid donors in Luanda, the government reported that "about 600 000 people affected 
by hunger, diseases and malnutrition" (Gunn, 1987: 59-60). South Africa's prime 
objective was to undermine Angola's economic viability by repeatedly invading the 
southern provinces of Angola so that from the end of 1981 until the battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale in 1987, the south of the country was occupied by the South African 
invading forces. Moreover, South Africa increased its support for UNIT A with the 
object offorcing the MPLA government into negotiations (Johnson and Martin, 1986: 
99). 
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3.4.4.3 Mozambique 
In the case of Mozambique, Pretoria covertly sponsored RENAMO as the major 
instrument of destabilisation. The end of 1981 saw a substantial escalation of 
RENAMO attacks which caused extensive damage to property such as homes and 
facilities such as schools and health installations (Johnson and Martin 1986: 20). The 
country also experienced attacks from members of the SADF directed mainly against 
ANC supporters. The Matola raid was the most obvious in which South African 
troops crossed the border and shelled and destroyed the residences of the AN C, killing 
twelve of its members (Jaster, 1985 : 107). There were also acts of sabotage against 
strategic installations, as well as disruption of economic activities against 
Mozambique. These included a partial economic boycott against the port of Maputo. 
It is argued that destabilisation tactics were aimed at weakening the economy in an 
effort to "reinforce propaganda offensive alleging that socialism equals economic 
chaos and deprivation" and also at disrupting the SADCC projects (Davies and 
O'Meara, 1985: 202-203). 
In 1984, Pretoria achieved its goal of destabilising Mozambique, dislodging it from 
the struggle through the signing of the Nkomati Accord33 According to N goma, the 
Accord brought some strains within the FLS alliance and was even dismissed by 
President Nyerere as "a resounding defeat" (Ngoma, 2005: 100). However, this did 
not deter other FLS members' in their resolve to resist apartheid. With the Accord, 
Maputo assured South Africa that it would stop allowing its territory to be used as a 
staging ground for South African liberation fighters. It also promised to banish them 
from the country in return for South Africa agreeing to end its support for RENAMO 
(Guelke, 1990: 245, Rich, 1994: 20). There was a hope that South Africa would 
honour the Accord and cease its acts of des tab iii sat ion (Gomes, 1984: 145). However, 
to some extent, sections of the defence establishment continued to support RENAMO 
after Nkomati (Rich, 1994: 20). 
33 With the Nkomati Accord, Mozambique and apartheid South Africa, among other things committed 
themselves to refrain from being used as bases, or staging grounds by "another state, government 
foreign military forces , organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, 
terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may 
threaten security of its inhabitants" (The Nkomati Accord in Johnson and Martin, 1986: 324) 
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3.4.4.4 Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, South Africa provided military support to Super-ZAPU dissidents 
operating from the Eastern Transvaal. Operations of dissidents were intended to cause 
political and economic damage to Zimbabwe. They uniquely targeted infrastructural 
and developmental projects including clinics, roads and railways (Dzimba, 1998: 59). 
These dissidents drew their support from the Matebeleland which is situated in the 
southwest of the country. In January 1993, the government dispatched a unit of the 
national army known as the Fifth Brigade to quell the rebellion. While the army tried 
to engage the dissidents militarily, there was also widespread killing of innocent 
people "akin to that inflicted to the people of Zimbabwe by the Rhodesian state" 
(Chiumbu, 1997: 1). 
Moreover, in early 1983, in the aftermath of the sabotage of the Beira-Mutare oil 
pipeline Pretoria put in place a number of measures aimed at blocking oil imports to 
Zimbabwe (Davies and 0' Meara, 1985: 204). While Zimbabwe did not support 
liberation movements in the same way as Mozambique and Angola by providing them 
with military facilities, and maintained close economic ties with South Africa, the 
crux of the matter is that Zimbabwe was basically hostile to apartheid. This claim was 
supported by its declaration of solidarity with the ANC and SWAPO (Geldenhuys, 
1995: 55). In this context, the only conceivable objective for destabilising Zimbabwe 
was to "prevent it from becoming economically strong enough to reduce its economic 
ties with South Africa ... and militarily strong enough not to be deterred by the 
Republic .. . " (Geldenhuys, 1995: 55). 
3.4.4.5 Zambia 
The apartheid regime in South Africa did not spare Zambia in its programme of 
destabilisation. Zambia was described as an outpost of subversion because of its 
support for liberation movements in South Africa (Jaster, 1985: 146). According to 
Jaster, the South African Defence White Paper of 1982 depicted Zambia as a Marxist 
state connected to the Soviet-inspired conspiracy against the apartheid government. 
These descriptions clearly put Zambia on the list of countries targeted for 
destabilisation. As a result, South Africa trained and armed Zambian dissident groups 
for this task. "The most sustaining form of aggression had been the laying of 
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landmines, which in addition to causmg loss of life and decline of agricultural 
production, had also deterred mining companies from prospecting in the area"(Jaster, 
1985: 146). While South Africa inflicted human and material costs in the course of 
destabilising Zambia, this did deter Zambia from providing a safe haven for liberation 
movements. 
3.2.4.6 Botswana 
Botswana became the last victim of the campaign of aggression by South Africa 
against its neighbours. According to Johnson and Martin, from February 1985 to 
February 1989 there were 20 recorded direct attacks or acts of sabotage involving the 
SADF (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 101). In June 1985, for example South Africa 
launched a military raid into Botswana in which twelve people were killed. In this 
raid, South Africa "claimed the targets were certain 'key' activists of the control 
centre of the Transvaal sabotage organisation of the ANC" (Ajulu and Cammack, 
1986: 151). The key reason for these attacks was to frighten and isolate the Botswana 
community from supporting South African freedom fighters and to put pressure on the 
government to expel them. While Botswana later agreed that its territory would not be 
"used as a launching pad against South Africa", it refused to sign a South African 
security pact reminiscent of the Nkomati Accord (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986: 151). 
3.3 The Decline of the Security Complex in Southern Africa 
According to Buzan, "security complexes ... represent durable rather than permanent 
patterns" within a system (Buzan, 1991: 191). This explains why the changing 
security developments in Southern Africa also meant the end of a regional security 
complex. On the military front, the decline of a security complex in the region was the 
result of the massive battle at Cuito Cuanavale a small town in the remote south-
eastern Angola. This became a symbol of a regional and continental resistance to 
South Africa's military might34 (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 122). It was this change 
in the military equation in Southern African that promoted political consultations and 
multilateral agreements among its member states in an attempt to prevent violent 
34 The contest between South Africa's aggression and the ability of Angola to defend itself resulted in 
severe casualties and loss of equipment on both sides but the heavily fortified town was held. This did 
not only serve as a moral boost for Angola, but it also disturbed the white public opinion in South 
Africa (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 122-123). 
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conflict and develop a practice of peaceful settlement of disputes (Adler, 1998: 132). 
This change was facilitated by the fact that the Cold War was in its end phase. On the 
political front, the decline of a security complex led to the dramatic development of 
negotiations between the United States, Cuba, Angola and South Africa in late 1987 
and early 1988. The negotiations also got support from the Soviet Union (Crocker, 
1994: 43-44). 
After a sequence of meetings held between Cuba, Angola, South Africa and the 
United States, the agreement was signed in New York in December 1988. These 
agreements centred on the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, and 
paved the way for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 43535 for a 
UN-sponsored transitional process to independence for Namibia. The agreement also 
covered the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, as well as the removal 
of ANC bases from the Angolan territory (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 123). The 
Soviet Union affirmed its support for an early settlement by publicly endorsing the 
New York agreement, thereby maintaining regular contacts with the United States 
(Crocker, 1994: 417). As Chester Crocker, the America Assistant Secretary of State 
for African affairs puts it, "once the settlement began to be implemented, the move 
toward Namibian independence and regional peace became irreversible ... Namibia 
became independent on March, 21 1990" (Crocker, 1992: 485). 
The dramatic changes in Angola and Namibia provided a fresh impetus for South 
Africa to consider a transition at home, abandon its apartheid policy and engage in 
negotiations with its liberation movements. There was a fresh opportunity in terms of 
recognising the reinterpretation of the old threat (Crocker, 1992: 492). The process 
was facilitated by the resignation of P. W. Botha and his replacement by a more 
moderate F. W. de Klerk in 1989. De Klerk initiated his first meeting with Mandela 
on 13 December 1989. At the meeting, Mandela brought forth a road map outlining a 
direction for negotiations. He emphasised that once the enabling environment for 
" Resolution 435 was adopted by the Security Council at its 2087 th meeting on 29 September 1978. it 
affirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia. Its objective was the withdrawal 
of the South African illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of 
Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations (Crocker, 1994: 495-499). 
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negotiations prevailed, the armed struggle would also be suspended (Schneindman, 
1994: 159). 
In addition, Mandela stressed "his openness to some form of power-sharing" 
(Schneinman, 1994: 160). Equally, De K1erk made a historic speech on 2 February 
1990 that legalised the ANC and thirty other Black parties followed by the release of 
Mandela nine days later. In that regard, "both the government and the ANC leadership 
have recognised their mutual interdependence and the need for cooperation if South 
Africa was to end" (Schneinman, 1994: 160) its intractable racial conflict. It is this 
transition phase of the 1990s that dismantled the apartheid machinery and led South 
Africa to a new democratic dispensation in 1994. Hence, the attainment of black 
majority rule in South Africa represents a fundamental break with a past that has so 
long been characterised by insecurity for the people of Southern Africa (Mandaza, 
1986: 120). 
3.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
The formation of the Southern African Development Community (SAD C) in 1992 
making use of the FLS and SADCC signalled a positive step in the changing character 
of regional security arrangements. The declaration accompanying the treaty of SADC 
identified cornmon historical experiences, common problems and aspirations as 
constituting the important step towards freedom and social justice, peace and security 
(Zacarias, 1998: 47). SADC declared war and insecurity to be the enemies of 
economic progress and social welfare and as a precondition, the region needed to set 
up frameworks and mechanisms to reinforce regional solidarity and provide for 
mutual peace and stability (Matlosa, 2000: 41). The formation of SADC marked the 
end of a security complex and transformed the region "from an anarchic sub-system 
of states to a single, larger actor within the system" (Buzan et ai, 1998:12). This also 
transformed the power structure within the complex since South Africa was no long 
perceived as a threat by its neighbours. It may be argued that this lent the region to the 
neo-liberal institutionalist analysis, which does not actually discount anarchy, but is 
optimistic about cooperation through institutions. 
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The fonnation of SADC transfonned the region into a security regime. In this context 
states essentially accrue benefits by setting up rules and institutions to control the 
competition among them (Jervis, 1982: 357-358). In a security regime environment, 
states engage in cooperative arrangements to reassure each other and reduce threats 
(Buzan, 1998: 12). At its inauguration SADC made a declaration that institutional 
arrangements were a preliminary requirement to guarantee political stability and 
mutual security as critical components of regional cooperation and integration 
(Nathan, 2004: 4). South Africa's accession to the body in 1994, completely 
transfonned its regional security policy towards its neighbours away from 
confrontation to cooperation (Matlosa, 2001: 394). 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid reduced the external support 
for the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. This gave fresh momentum for positive 
conflict management efforts aimed at settling inter-state and intra-state disputes. To 
achieve these, the region needed to institutionalise a system of democratic governance 
and political stability based upon sustainable peace and security (Matlosa, 2000: 40). 
Most importantly, the end of apartheid in South Africa had "removed a major source 
of regional strife and created the possibility of an inclusive regional body" (Nathan, 
2004: 4). 
The SADC's rnam objectives centre on the achievement of development and 
economic growth, the alleviation of poverty and the advancement of the standard and 
the quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa. SADC also pledges to provide 
support to the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. The achievement 
of these objectives is to be realised through increased regional integration, building of 
democratic principles, equitable and sustainable development. SADC seeks to 
establish common economic, political, social values and systems by enhancing 
enterprises and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule 
of law and guarantees of human rights and popular participation. SADC also affinns 
to maintain regional solidarity in order for the people of the region to live and work 
together in harmony (SADC Treaty 1992). Yet how these goals might best be 
achieved was left open to multiples of interpretations. 
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In sum, the apartheid regime in South Africa, within the broad environment of the 
Cold War played a central role in shaping the Southern African security situation. 
While South Africa wanted to exert its domination in the region through trade and aid, 
the fall of the Portuguese regime drastically changed its foreign policy from 
cooperation to aggressiveness. This was characterised by the adoption of a Total 
Strategy as its policy framework that included the military destabilisation of the 
uncooperative governments in the region. However, the Total Strategy became less 
relevant with the end of the Cold War and the independence of Namibia. The most 
remarkable event, which constituted the break up of a complex, was the establishment 
of SADC. SADC clearly spelt out the relationship between security and development 
by stressing the importance of "human rights, democracy and the rule of law ... 
peaceful settlement of disputes ... achievement of growth and alleviation of poverty" 
(SADC Treaty, 1992). Given this situation, it may be argued that this development 
paved the way for the possibility of a security community in the region. The 
possibility of the region becoming a security community will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
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4.0 TOWARDS SECURITY COMMUNITY BUILDING? FROM THE 
WINDHOEK PROPOSALS TO THE ORGAN ON POLITICS 
DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION (OPDSC) 
Using a neo-realist paradigm, the previous chapter made an attempt to examine the 
evolution of security in Southern Africa from an 'overlay' before 1974, through a 
'security complex' in the late 1970s and to the 'security regime ' of the 1990s. 
Emerging from the legacies of destruction and destabilisation unleashed by the 
apartheid military (Campbell, 1997: 4), the post-apartheid Southern Africa is marked 
by developments inclined to increase interdependence, sustainable peace and security 
among member states (Zacarias, 1997: 52). This chapter uses a constructivist security 
community paradigm to explore the implications of the SADC' s efforts to adopt new 
forms of regional security cooperation, in an attempt to transform the region into a 
security community following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid 
in South Africa. An understanding of security developments in Southern Africa 
carries great weight "when viewed through the security community paradigm" 
(Ngoma, 2005: 7). As such, the Declaration of the Treaty of SADC in 1992 
represented an expression of confidence in which developments such as the 
independence of Namibia and the transition in South Africa were expected to take the 
region out of an era of conflict to one of a security community characterised by a 
climate of peace, security and stability (Cilliers, 1995:38). 
Despite the changing regional environment, conflict and instability continued to 
characterise the Southern African states. Whilst the superpowers were retreating from 
the region, it became necessary for SADC to set up its own mechanisms for the 
prevention and management of conflicts (Matiosa, 2000: 39). In this set up, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe have been politically the most important states in the region; 
the fit of their roles will be explored later in this chapter. Nevertheless, the changing 
security situation in the region posed a tremendous challenge to SADC "to prove 
itself as an organisation not only worthy of its existence, but also relevance" (Sukma, 
2003:1). The effort was facilitated by global developments where under Article 52 of 
the UN Charter36, the delegation ofresponsibility for conflict management was being 
36 Article 52 (I) of the UN Charter provides for the existence of regional arrangements or agencies to 
deal with matters pertaining to "maintenance of international peace and security as a re appropriate for 
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transferred from the United Nations to the regional and sub-regional levels (van 
Schalkwyk, 2005: 43). This posed a remarkable challenge to the regional "security 
arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community's Organ of 
Politics Defence and Security Cooperation" (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 43) to bring 
sustainable security and stability in the region, the major assumption being that the 
achievement of sustainable security might put Southern Africa on the margins of a 
security community. 
Deutsch defines a security community as a condition in which "states become 
integrated to the point that they have a sense of a community, which, in turn creates 
the assurance that they will settle their disputes short of war" (Adler and Barnett, 
1998: 3). In other words, a security community is created by a mutual compatibility of 
values, the absence of competitive military build-up among the regional actors, a total 
absence of inter-state conflicts, strong institutional relations and practices which serve 
to reduce, prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and disorder and allow for greater 
mobility of people and exchange of ideas (Deutsch cited in Zacarias, 1998: 44, 
Sukma, 2003: 2). Vehicles for bringing about a security community are shared values, 
norms and symbols that in turn provide social identities across the region (Adler, and 
Barnett, 1998: 3). 
Adler argues that security communities do not actually evolve impulsively; rather 
they are socially constructed by institutions (Adler, 1998: 119). For Southern Africa, 
the setting up of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) as 
the SADC's security arrangement and the subsequent formulation of the Strategic 
Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) as an enabling instrument for the implementation 
of the Organ's objectives (SIPO, 2004: 6), epitomise an attempt of such socially 
constructed institutions that can be used as vehicles for setting the region on the path 
of security community building. In establishing whether the OPDSC is an appropriate 
vehicle for bringing about a security community, this chapter seeks to transcend the 
neo-realist approach to security and adopt a constructivist paradigm to identifY 
conditions under which a security community is developing, but also being retarded in 
the region. 
regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". 
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Security community building practices include strengthening civil society and 
changing peoples' beliefs (Adler, 1998: 120-121) by inculcating common norms and 
common values. As Adler argues, "the creation and nurturing of civil society ... is a 
necessary condition for the construction of a security community" (Adler, 1998: 130). 
However, the concept of civil society is a subject of scholarly debate since there is a 
lack of theoretical clarity underlying it. For example, liberals argue that civil society 
advocates the rule of law and collectively limit the power of the state. By contrast, 
Marx perceives the state as subordinate to civil society, operating in the realm of 
economic relations (Shaw and MacLean, 2001: 171). On the other hand, Hegel 
conceives of civil society as consisting of simply the formal recognition of individuals 
as property holders and parties to contract but not sufficient ethical community. Hegel 
undermines the moral priority of civil society within the liberal tradition by 
understanding states as the form of higher association and the ultimate ethical 
community which should rule and guide the civil society (Baker, 2003: 5). 
Despite these different theoretical perspectives, the study will adopt a constructivist 
approach which conceives of civil society as incorporating a plethora of interactions 
between states and civil society actors "on a large variety of technical, practical and 
normative subjects" to provide "purpose, meaning and direction to security relations" 
both at domestic and regional levels (Adler, 120: 121). Civil society integrates a wide 
range actors, such as academics, religious groups, media, and women's groups, trade 
unions, human rights groups and so on (International Peace Academy, 2000: 5). These 
actors can collectively limit the power of states at both domestic and regional levels 
by transforming their "strategic practices, both behavioural and rhetorical" to promote 
collective identities (Adler, 1998: 120). 
In the Southern African context, these actors are needed for monitoring security 
policies made by states and bringing in input into decision-making at domestic and 
regional levels thereby giving greater purpose, meaning and direction to security 
relations (Adler, 1998: 120-121). It is against this background that the Windhoek 
workshop, which involved civil society actors, convened shortly after the 
establishment of SADC to deliberate on redefining regional security. This was a clear 
indication of embracing cooperative security to create a sense of a community based 
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on mutual trust and collective identity responsible for the emergence of security 
communities. 
4.1 Contending Approaches by Policy-Makers, the Windhoek Workshop on 
Democracy, Peace and Political Cooperation. 
The key event of attempts for building a security community in the region was the 
establishment of SADC in 1992. Not only did it focus on economic development, but 
it also took considerable measures to promote security cooperation. For example, in 
1993, SADC's "programme of action37 recommended a strategy for advancing 
regional security including the adoption of a wider definition of security; the 
establishment of a forum for mediation and arbitration and reducing the level of 
military expenditure" (Zacarias, 1998: 48). In line with reducing the level of military 
expenditure was the promotion of arms control agreements, military transparency and 
cooperation38 . In other words, SADC placed itself on a path that conforms to the idea 
of cooperative security39 in an attempt to promote levels of confidence and 
cooperation, the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, consolidation of 
justice and democracy and advancement of human rights (Adler, 1998: 132). In a 
sense, this was geared towards redressing the legacies of the apartheid military and 
political destruction in the region. 
The formulation of regional policy measures to enhance peace and security between 
1992 and 1993 was driven by the SADC Secretariat. Thus, in 1993, the Secretariat 
prepared the Framework and Strategy document which called for the forging of 
political values grounded on democratic values, the creation of a non-militarist 
security order and the establishment of a procedure that would help states to avoid, 
manage, and resolve conflict. The document stressed a "need to address non-military 
sources of conflict and threats to human security, such as underdevelopment and 
abuse of human rights" (Nathan, 2004: 5). This policy was formulated at the time 
37 The SADC programme of action was driven by the Secretariat who fonnulated strategies for 
advancing the regional security agenda that sought to adopt a people-centred approach to security. 
After 1993, these recommendations were rejected by SA DC member states because some of them were 
thought to be intrusive and would impinge in their sovereignty (Cilliers, 1995: 40). 
38 The programme advocated the existence of robust and legitimate political and civil institutions to 
oversee and manage stable civil military relations and interaction between state and civil society over 
the formulation and implementation of defence policy (Williams, 1998: 36). 
39 For the definition of cooperative security see Chapter Two. 
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when Southern Africa was besieged by a variety of formidable problems for which no 
direct regional remedies were in sight. At a domestic level, these included an 
"absence of effective governance, internal political and ethnic conflict, unstable civil-
military relations, a proliferation of small arms in private hands; a large number of 
demobilised soldiers who are destitute; chronic underdevelopment and attendant 
poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; countless refugees and displaced 
people"(Nathan, 1995: 2). Here civil society actors were needed to help states and the 
region stabilise events. 
In this context, the most important event in this period was the SADC' s Workshop on 
Democracy, Peace and Security held in Windhoek in July 1994. In recognition of the 
widening of security, the workshop sought to move beyond the confines of a state-
centred conception and included academics, human rights activists, ministers, officials 
and parliamentarians (Campbell, 1997: 7, Nathan, 2004: 5) in its deliberations. The 
importance of the workshop was that it provided an opportunity for SADC to redefine 
the idea of security "so that the security and the well-being of the peoples remains the 
primary focus" (Campbell, 1997: 5). The workshop was a clear indicator for a project 
which foresaw an emerging security community in Southern Africa that would 
transform regional security architecture and bring about a new security agenda in the 
region previously bedevilled by violent conflict. 
With the collapse of apartheid and the attendant accession of South Africa to SADC, 
the SADC Summit in August 1994 decided to "disband the Frontline States as an 
entity which had served as the effective political arm of SADCC ... and replace it with 
the framework for political and security cooperation" (Bischoff, 200 I: 281). The 
move was made possible by the fact that the internal political transformation in South 
Africa had essentially changed "that country's regional security policy away from 
confrontation towards cooperation with and accommodation of the security interests 
of its neighbours" (Matlosa, 2001: 394). 
As a result, the Windhoek workshop proposed that the area of Conflict Resolution and 
Political Cooperation should, akin to other areas of SADC work divided into sectors, 
be turned into a 'Sector' whose responsibility should be given to one SADC member 
state (Cilliers, 1999: I). The proposal included setting up the Protocol on Peace, 
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Security and Political Cooperation, the establishment of the SADC Sector on Conflict 
Resolution and the formation of an independent Human Rights Commission (Nathan, 
2004: 5). The formation of an independent human rights commission was a clear sign 
of the region's departure from state-centred neo-realist security concerns and 
signalled a move towards a human security perspective. It was geared towards setting 
up regional standards and norms "applicable both within each state and throughout the 
community" (Adler, 1998: 132). 
Following the resolutions and recommendations which transpired from the workshop, 
the proposal was deferred "to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers in 
Botswana where many of the intrusive potentially prescriptive recommendations that 
could infringe upon the sovereignty of member countries, were abandoned" (Cilliers, 
1995: 40). The sector idea would have allowed for security and development to be 
treated jointly by providing a robust linkage between the two and formulating 
compatible policies. More importantly, the setting up of a sector recommended by the 
Windhoek workshop was rebuffed by the delegates who decided to establish a wing 
for conflict prevention and mediation (Cillers, 1995: 40). Unlike a sector, the wing 
was intended to be an independent entity from other sectors of SADC, which 
essentially separates security from development and prioritises state security matters 
over developmental issues. These two parallel ideas become a source of dispute 
among SADC member states and weakened the security approach envisioned by the 
SADC Secretariat. 
The preoccupation with sovereignty meant that from SADC's creation, member states 
were not prepared to render themselves accountable to one another in their internal 
affairs. As such, it became difficult, if not impossible for them to align their policies 
with that of a community despite the fact that SADC aimed at "setting out the task of 
promoting regional peace and stability to strengthen the foundation for prosperous 
peaceful community" (Sukma, 2003: 2). As such, state-centredness towards peace in 
the region remained the preserve of governments with little involvement of civil 
society. As a result, the subsequent meetings of SADC, such as the one held in Harare 
in March 1995 saw non-state actors and civil society actors no longer invited to assist 
in deliberations regarding regional security (Nathan, 2004: 5). This implied that 
instead of "marching down the road of political unification" with the objective of 
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harnessing coordination and cooperation, it appeared that the SADC states "discarded 
the idea of becoming a security commW1ity ... from the onset" (Barnett and Gause, 
1998: 169). 
To reinforce state-centredness in security, the delegates at the meeting held in Harare 
on 3 March 1995 proposed the formation of a new entity: The Association of 
Southern African States (ASAS). AS AS was proposed because "many states did not 
support the anti-militarist stance and the democratic norms espoused by the SADC 
Treaty" (Nathan, 2004: 6, Cilliers, 1995: 40). The rejection of the democratic norms 
espoused by the treaty was a great blow to the establishment of an effective system of 
governance in Southern Africa both domestically and regionally. This was a clear 
indication that the important tenets of a security community such as the compatibility 
of democratic values and social learning were not on the agenda of SADC member 
states. It opened up the way for allowing a non-democratic Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to join the SADC without "knowledge necessary for imitation ... about 
the workings of democracy and the rule of law" (Schimmelfenning, quoted in Adler, 
1998: 133). Not only did the SADC ignore its own prerequisites for membership it 
also flouted the objectives of its own treaty, which provides for the evolution of 
"common political values, systems and institutions" (SADC Treaty, 1992). 
When ASAS was proposed as an alternative to a sector in pursuit of the decision by 
SADC Foreign Ministers on March 3 1995 to establish a wing (Cilliers, 1995: 40), the 
bulk of the Windhoek proposals had already been toned down. In this context, ASAS 
considerably reduced40 the role of non-state actors. Moreover, in tinkering with the 
Windhoek proposals, ASAS was put forward amid two mindsets: the statists, led by 
Zimbabwe, who supported military resolutions of conflict and the liberals, led by 
South, Africa who favoured non-military preventive diplomacy. The bone of 
contention aroW1d these opposing sets of ideas appeared to stem from the legal 
interpretation of the SADC Treaty (Goncalves, 1997: 40). 
40 While the ASAS document provided for peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion and enhancement 
of the development of democratic institutions and practices and observance of human rights , it does not 
mention any involvement of non-state and civil society actors in these. This means the implementation 
of the document remain the prerogative ofgovemments to the exclusion of the civil society. 
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While South Africa emphasised preventive diplomacy towards conflict resolution, it 
did not rule out taking into account military security concerns. According to Selebi, 
South Africa's approach to the security of Southern Africa is founded on three pillars: 
national security, human security and environmental security (Selebi, 1999: 6). Like 
many other states promoting reforms in the post-Cold War period, South Africa had 
discarded the narrow neo-realist interpretation of security dominant during the Cold 
War in favour the liberal approach (Hammerstad, 2005: 7). This was marked by 
"considerable demilitarisation" and the "abandoning of nuclear deterrence" (Cawthra, 
1999: I). It was founded on the legacy of apartheid which, acted as a source of human 
insecurity not only in South Africa itself, but across the entire Southern Africa region. 
Overall, South Africa believes that "conflict can never be resolved through violence, 
but only through negotiations and agreements" (Hamrnerstad, 2005: 18). These ideas 
conform to the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of the SADC Treaty41 It is these 
principles and objectives that "provide content to the intention to move to a common 
system of political values, systems and institutions - a commitment which has thus far 
been sadly lacking among a number of SADC member states" (Malan and Cilliers, 
1997: I). This not withstanding, Zimbabwe interpreted the South Africa's own policy 
framework as a product of "ideological institutions which were deployed to unleash 
disinformation and psychological warfare" during the apartheid era and "have been 
restructured as peace institutions" (Campbell, 1997: 4). Zimbabwe challenged South 
Africa's liberal stance because this did not go along with the conservative neo-realist 
approach it espouses. The approach favours a narrow neo-realist interpretation of 
security as the military defence of regimes against internal and external attack 
(Harnmerstad, 2005: 18). From basic misunderstanding and disagreement, the idea of 
the SADC as community in a Deutschian sense increasingly became highly 
questionable. It was the articulation of these politico-ideological differences that 
"precipitated the current crisis in SADC political and security cooperation" (Malan 
and eilliers, as quoted in Ngoma, 2005: 146). 
4\ Article 4 of the SADC Treaty provides for the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule 
oflaw and peaceful settlements of dispute, while Article 5 provides for the sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources and effective protection oftbe environment. 
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These politico-ideological differences constituted a serIOUS setback in terms of 
creating mutual trust and forging a collective identity considered central for the 
emergence of security communities. The most fundamental problem that arose was 
the fact that when ASAS was proposed, Ministers of Defence and Police and 
Intelligence communities were not consulted in the formulation of such proposals 
(Cilliers, 1995: 41). While ASAS was to be guided by the principles of the Windhoek 
document, it was nevertheless to be "confined to issues of preventive diplomacy, 
conflict management/resolution, peace, stability and peacekeeping" (Matlosa, 2000: 
41) undertaken by state actors. The extent to which ASAS allowed for non-state 
actors and civil society participation was systematically diluted and hampered the 
SADC Secretariat project for redefining regional security. 
As mentioned above, from its inception the SADC Secretariat was responsible for 
formulating the regional policy on security and produced a wide-ranging strategy for 
redefining regional security. The ASAS proposal disempowered the Secretariat by 
undermining its original strategy. In terms of its structure, AS AS was to function 
independently from the SADC Secretariat and report directly to the SADC Heads of 
State and Government (Southall 1996: I). It was to integrate two sectors, one 
concerned with political affairs and the other with military security (Cillers, 1999: I). 
From this perspective, it may be argued that it was the dislocation of these two sectors 
from SADC's socio-economic agenda, which brought about the ambiguity that 
besieged the ASAS structure's role and status vis-a-vis SADC. This lack of 
commonly shared vision rendered ASAS stillborn (Matlosa, 200 I: 408). In the face of 
it, the Windhoek workshop proposals suffered a serious setback in the initial phase of 
SADC's effort to establish a regional security arrangement. 
4.2 The Battle for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
In August 1995, at the SADC Summit held in Johannesburg, some delegates, 
especially from South Africa were uncomfortable with the name ASAS and the idea 
that such sensitive sector would be assigned to individual member state on a 
permanent basis (Cilliers, 1999: 1-2). As Campbell puts it, ASAS "idea was met with 
hostile reviews from the South African media, which questioned the basis of the 
sovereignty which would accompany this association" (Campbell, 1997: 7). The main 
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worry about sovereignty was that it would not allow for the participation of civil 
society actors in regional security matters, especially the resolution of conflict. In fact, 
after its accession to SADC in 1994, South Africa had drawn itself closer to playing 
"an increasingly significant role in the re-orientation of the region towards peace-
making" (Bischoff, 2001: 282). 
Because of the differing views among SADC member states, the final communique 
issued in the Johannesburg meeting in August 1995 no longer mentioned AS AS by 
name. Instead, Foreign Ministers requested time for more consultations among 
themselves and with ministers responsible for defence and security (Cillers, 1999: 2). 
This request was considered on 18 January 1996, at the meeting in Gaborone of the 
SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. The succeeding press 
statements confirmed the recommendation of the SADC Summit's new support for 
"the establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which, would 
allow more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive potentially 
explosive situations"(Quoted in Cillers, 1999: 2). The SADC Organ on Politics 
Defence and Security (OPDS) was formalised through a communique in Gaborone in 
199642 with President Mugabe as its Chair (Matlosa, 200 I : 410, Breytenbach, 2000: 
86). What remained clear with the formation of the OPDS was that military and 
security considerations still defined regional security (Campbell, 1997: 8) thus 
detracting from the spirit of the SADC Treaty. It meant that the possibility that 
regional disputes would be solved through peaceful means drawing on non-state 
actors by the region was to be more rhetoric than reality. 
Like ASAS before it, the OPDS functioned within the framework of SADC. While 
the OPDS incorporated most of the principles and objectives of ASAS, there were 
some notable differences. These included the promotion of the political, economic, 
social and environmental dimensions of security, development of collective security 
by concluding a mutual defence pact and developing close cooperation between 
police and security services in the region (SADC Communique cited in Ngoma, 2005: 
281). Despite these progressive changes the OPDS was handicapped by the fact that it 
42 President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, in his capacity as a chairperson wrote a letter to his SADC 
counterparts dated 14 May 1996 declaring that the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) has 
been established (Cilliers, 1999: 2). 
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was a compromIse that sought to reconcile the differing views between SADC 
Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Defence, State Security and Public Security. As 
such, its defence and security committee has "played the dominant role in the regional 
security ... the interpretation would be therefore that military security takes precedence 
over a more development oriented agenda" (Ngoma, 2005: 148). This clearly 
indicates that the OPDS did not make allowance for non-state actor participation. 
While the Windhoek proposals were quite specific regarding the connection between 
development and security, this idea was unfortunately left out in the core framework 
of the negotiations of the Organ. The principle was "diluted, ignored, and even 
completely rejected, during the critical periods leading to the establishment of the 
Organ inputs were not sought from academics, conflict management, human rights 
practitioners and organs of civil society" (Tsie, 1998: 4). By snubbing the inputs from 
across the broader cross-sections of the society, the extent to which the Organ 
provided for participation of non-state forces was to be limited. In other words, OPDS 
was not open to marrying security with development and instead favoured a statist 
position in which military interpretations of security predominated and as such 
crowded out non-state centred interpretations of conflict and conflict resolution. 
Whereas the SADC Treaty stresses a need for peaceful settlement of disputes, 
democracy, peace and security, the truth confronting the region is an emphasis on the 
military solution to conflicts. "This does not only undermine constructive and 
sustainable management of conflicts, but further weakens democratic governance and 
retards economic development" (Matlosa, 2000: 40). 
In terms of its structure and its place in the SADC, the Organ was to function at the 
summit or heads of state level. This meant that SADC would have two summits and, 
presumably two goals, namely, politico-security and economic development or 
integration (Leysens and Thompson, 2001: 58). Breytenbach notes, "What actually 
happened was that SADC was split into two socio-economic and the security 
legs ... for example, one head of state would be in charge of SADC and another in 
charge of the Organ" (Breytenbach, 2000: 86-88). This impeded the functional 
capacity of the organ thereby causing confusion among member states. Instead, of 
resolving conflict, the launching of the Organ created continual antagonistic and 
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recriminatory debates around the security's body structure43 as manifestations of 
strategic and political differences among member states (Nathan, 2004: 6). Given this 
situation, a sense of a community that requires "members of a community to support 
the creation of institutions and procedures which are capable of ensuring peaceful 
change" (Hodges, 1978: 244) was obstructed. This means that the constructivist 
notion of collective identity formation and the attendant transnational convergence of 
domestic values (Wendt, 1997: 390) which constitute the foundation for security 
community building were not considered. 
By the second half of 1997, just about 15 months after its inception and at the time of 
the crisis in Lesotho and the DRC, the Organ continued to encounter problems on 
how to function effectively. It all revolved around the ambiguity about the position of 
the chair of the Organ, its functional independence, and operational procedures in 
regard to the resolution of conflict (Breytenbach, 2000: 85). This explains why on the 
emergence of new conflicts in Lesotho and the DRC, there was no structural 
mechanism to deal with them (Breytenbach, 2000: 89). For example, in September 
1998, the Lesotho government requested assistance from South Africa to reinstate law 
and order following election related unrest. South Africa and Botswana intervened 
militarily, ostensibly under the auspices of SADC (Neethling, 2004: 7). However, the 
intervention was criticised since the OPDS had not been used and was not functioning 
at the time whi lst, the SADC Treaty did not make allowance for the use of ' SA DC 
troops ' (Breytenbach, 2000: 92). 
The most defining moment as regards to the disagreement amongst SADC member 
states was the outbreak of broad-based conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), which had joined SADC in 1997. On 2 August 1998, rebel forces of 
43 For South Africa, the gist of the argument was that the SADC Treaty did not provide for an 
independently constituted SADC Summit. South African's stance was seemingly not to dispute the idea 
of SA DC chair for the Organ per se, both at heads of state level. Rather its major concern was the fact 
that "if the organ was to deal with political matters, the SADC summit would eventually play a 
secondary fiddle". South Africa argued that there was a need for a single integrated regional 
cooperation mechanism (Cilliers, 1999: 2). Accordingly, conflict management was too important to be 
the responsibility of a single member state (Neethling, 2000: 5). In response, Zimbabwe's contended 
that SADC was a donor-funded economic body and for that reason the Southern African region could 
not delegate its political and security responsibilities to it (Neethling, 2004: 5). As such, the Organ 
should operate independently from other SADC structures, which include the SADC Summit. For 
Zimbabwe, this would allow for an ad hoc flexible approach in response to unpredictable situations 
occurring in the region (Soderbaum, 200 I: 107). 
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Congolese Rally for Democracy, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, instigated a revolt 
against the DRC government (Nathan, 2004: 12). Subsequently, the DRC government 
appealed to SADC for military and political assistance. Nathan writes, "On 8 August 
1998 Zimbabwe convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of states from a number of 
African countries". At this meeting, South Africa was excluded as a chair of SADC, 
ostensibly because of strained relations between itself and Zimbabwe (Nathan, 2004: 
12). The difference of opinion regarding the resolution of the DRC conflict 
demonstrates that SADC is not integrated as a community in a Deutschian sense. 
Because of the lack of unity among SADC member states, cooperative security 
practices that offer a means of dealing with security problems, such as conflict 
avoidance through preventive diplomacy, designed as the process of community 
building (Adler, 1998: 136) were ignored. The absence of these practices led to 
Zimbabwe's decision to deploy troops in the DRC, backed by Namibia and Angola. 
While the justification provided for the deployment of troops was the notion of a 
collective defence against the alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda, 
the SADC Treaty did not provide for collective defence. Although another claim was 
that the deployment was authorised by the SADC Organ, the Organ itself was not 
effectively operational at the time (Nathan, 2004: 13). The conflict in the DRC 
effectively incapacitated diplomatic unity within the SADC and considerably marred 
future chances of deepened regional cooperation. In this respect, N goma assumes that 
"rather than a uniform drive towards a security commlmity, the region appeared to 
take a disjointed one" (Ngoma, 2005: 160). 
The emergence of the broad-based Congolese war and attempts to solve it illustrated 
the lack of coordinated response to conflict. As mentioned above, it was also a 
manifestation of politico-ideological divisions between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
with different values and priorities being pursued. In the one, camp there is a militarist 
block, dominated by Zimbabwe preferring military solution and on the other there are 
those who favour political and diplomatic options for conflict management dominated 
by South Africa (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 50). The South Africa's camp comprising 
Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, stood for a human security approach and 
conceived of the Organ as a platform "whose primary basis for multilateral 
cooperation and peacemaking would be political rather than military" (Nathan, 2004: 
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7). Zimbabwe's camp, comprising Angola and Namibia challenged South Africa's 
human security approach in the peace and security field (Hammerstad, 2005: 18), in 
favour of a mutual defence pact which prioritises military cooperation in response to 
conflict (Nathan, 2004: 7). These and other contentious issues demonstrated a deep-
seated contestation of power, authority and influence, among member states (Matlosa, 
2000: 40). It clearly shows that the region suffered from the low intensity of trust and 
collective identity, considered to be the entrenched pillars upon which security 
communities may emerge (Ngoma, 2005: 2). The fundamental difference centred on 
whether there was a relationship between the conception of security and development. 
These differences lie at the bottom of South Africa and Zimbabwe's policy 
orientations and became apparent in some of the broader strategic positions of their 
foreign policy formulation, conduct and practices (Rupiya, 2002: 2) during the 
Congolese war. 
The signing the defence pact44 in Luanda on 8 April 1999 between Zimbabwe, 
Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo exemplified the intrinsic 
divisions within SADC countries45 . It worked against Adler and Barnett's first tier 
model for the emergence of security communities which, requires member states to 
coordinate their foreign policies as a confidence-building measure. Madanza 
persuasively argues that the pact stood in stark contrast to the position of South Africa 
on the subject of collective security in general, and the DRC in particular (Mandaza, 
2001: 6). This clearly points towards a lack of policy coordination. According to 
Zimbabwe, it was "superfluous and hypocritical of South African government and its 
apologists to advocate a strict adherence to early warning and diplomatic solution to 
SADC conflicts" (Tapfumaneyi, quoted in Nathan, 2004: 17). To understand the 
policy issues of South Africa and Zimbabwe and how these influence the security 
situation in Southern African, it is important to look at each country's disposition 
separately. 
44 The Pact provided for mutual military assistance between the four states; affmned support for the 
Angolan government against the UNITA rebels; expressed the finnest support for the legitimate 
government of the ORC, while condemning Rwanda and Uganda for invading the ORC; and urged the 
other member countries of SADC to provide "political, diplomatic, and material" assistance to the 
Angolan government, while reminding SADC as a whole that the organization had adopted a resolution 
in September, 1998, declaring Savimbi a "war criminal"(Madaza, 200 I: 6). 
45 The Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and DRC defence pact does not have any relations with the SADC 
mutual defence pact adopted in 2003. This was purely a military alliance between these three states 
which had nothing to do with SAOC. 
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South Africa espouses a neo-liberal civil society-centred foreign policy that perceives 
security and development as being interwoven. With this policy, South Africa is not 
likely to deviate from the SADC Treaty46 Building on the aggressive legacy of the 
apartheid state, the South African foreign policy is founded on the conviction that the 
integrates of human rights, norms, solidarity, politics and development needs 
(Chhabra, 1997: 53) are part and parcel of security. For South Africa, the "most 
profound of all the choices relating to national security, is therefore, the trade off with 
liberty ... two quite distinct values of human development" (Ullman, 1983: 131). This 
forms the basis of South African approach for resolution of conflict in the region. 
Zimbabwe's foreign policy is underlined by a realist state-centred tendency that 
separates development from security. In the words of Keohane and Nye, the "high 
politics" of military security dominates the "low politics" of economic and social 
affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24). Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe's foreign 
policy takes a divergent position from the SADC Treaty and considers it as 
counterproductive to any effort to "imprison the Organ in the SADC Treaty" (Nathan, 
2004: 7). In terms of security, Zimbabwe prioritises "a definition that assumes the 
basic primacy of political variables in determining a degree of security that states and 
regimes enjoy" (Ayoob, 1991: 259). Such variables include values such as 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence. These values are 
suggestive of the fact that different types of vulnerability, including economic, social 
and ecological dimensions are only subsumed under this definition of security when 
they become sensitive "enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten 
state boundaries, state institutions or regime survival" (Ayoob, 1991 : 259). 
4.3 Restructuring the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
At the end of the 1990s, it became evident that the effectiveness of the OPDS as the 
regional security structure had been submerged by numerous institutional and political 
problems since its inception in 1996. This impasse compelled SADC leaders to find 
ways of restructuring the Organ (Neethling, 2004: 1). The purpose of a restructuring 
46 Article of the SA DC 4 Treaty directs member states to observe, democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law and peaceful settlement of disputes, while Article 5 provides for the achievement of 
development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the 
people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. 
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process was to attend to the outstanding issues that had paralysed the Organ since its 
formation. The main issues of contention centred on different conceptions of security 
between the central players South Africa and Zimbabwe, who could not agree on the 
status of the Organ's Chairman, the position of its Summit and its place within SADC 
(Breytenbach, 2000: 89, Leysens and Thompson, 2001: 59). Potentially, this opened 
the window of opportunity for the SADC to rearrange itself and plant the "seeds of 
peaceful change" (Adler, 1998: 119) in its security structure to make it more 
accommodative to civil society actors. 
Tsie reminds us that the fundamental point of departure for restructuring the OPDS 
was the July 1994 Windhoek proposals, particularly their recognition of the 
importance of "involving all the stakeholders in regional security and peace, not just 
the military, police and intelligence agencies" (Tsie, 1998: 4). However, the 
restructuring process was entirely an intergovernmental exercise. It was proposed at 
the extraordinary meeting of the SADC heads of state and government held in Maputo 
on 2 March 1998. As a result, the committee made up of the Presidents of 
Mozambique, Malawi and Namibia was mandated to look into ways of ending the 
SADC Organ standoff (Breytenbach, 2000: 89, Matlosa, 2001: 410, Leysens and 
Thompson, 200 I: 59). The committee was expected to thoroughly examine the 
problem and prepare a report in the context of its findings (Matlosa, 200 I: 410). The 
report came up with a number of recommendations; the most prominent among these 
were that the chairman of the SADC Summit should be the chairman of the Organ, 
and that the chair of SADC should rotate on the annual basis. But, for reasons not 
stipulated, heads of state and government did not approve tllese recommendations and 
most surprisingly the committee's report was not tabled either at Mauritius or the 
1999 Maputo Summits (Matlosa, 2001: 410). Another review committee made up of 
Mozambique, Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe was established whose terms of 
reference47 were approved by the Council of Ministers meeting in Mbabane, 
Swaziland, in February 2000. The progress report for this meeting was tabled at the 
47 In preparation for the extraordinary ministerial meeting, a working session of officials from 
Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe assembled in Pretoria from 29 September to I October 1999 to 
prepare the terms of reference. These included the appropriate SADC Organ structure, refining the 
protocol, drafting the mutual defence pact, and the permanency of the Secretariat (Cilliers, 1999: 8). 
70 
Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia in August 2001; and the final report48 was agreed 
at an extra-ordinary summit on 9 March 2001 (Landesberg, 2002: 9). 
During the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government held 
in Namibia on 9 March 2001 , the proposals for the restructuring of the Organ were 
considered and an agreement was reached that the operations and functions of the 
Organ should be regulated by the Protocol on Politics Defence and Security. It was 
agreed that the integration of the Organ into SADC structures and coordination at the 
Summit level on the Troika basis reporting to the Chairperson of the Summit. The 
Summit also considered that the Chairperson of the Organ rotate annually (200 I 
SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit Communique). South Africa was also instrumental in 
influencing the restructuring of the OPDS by advancing a multilateral approach in 
resolving regional conflict. It hosted several inter-Congolese dialogues and peace 
summits, which commenced in 1999. By brokering peace and resolving conflict South 
Africa diplomatically outmanoeuvred the Zimbabwe militarist alliance and became 
instrumental in fostering new value systems and culture as far as regional institutions 
are concerned (Matheba, 2003: 27). The restructuring process was legitimised by the 
signing of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
(OPDSC) in Blantyre, Malawi, in 2001 (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 44). While the 
OPDSC seems to be more progressive than its predecessors, in terms of asserting the 
region as a security community, it is effectively paralysed by the affirmation of the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
4.4 The Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) Since 
2001 
With the reforms of 2001, SADC's leaders had clearly realised the importance of 
maintaining peace and security and promoting democratisation and democratic 
governance (Landesberg, 2002: 6). The OPDSC differs to some extent from the 
OPDS in that whereas the OPDS was established by a communique, the OPDSC was 
established by Protocol and has a constitution. The most important development was 
that OPDSC lost its former independence and formally became an integral part of 
" In April 200 I , the review committee presented its report on the restructuring of SADC institutions. 
The key areas of focus were: the objectives and common agenda of SADC, strategic priorities, 
institutional reforms, management systems, resource mobilisation, admission of new members, 
implementation of reforms and cost estimates for the new SADC structure (Landesberg, 2002: 9). 
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SADC49 The significance of this is that it was incorporated into the socio-economic 
agenda of SADC. Another difference is that the OPDSC set up mechanisms for the 
implementation of its objectives such as the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ50 
(SIPO). 
Article 10 (I) of the OPDSC Protocol recognises that "political, defence and security 
matters transcend national and regional boundaries" and encourages the significance 
of cooperating with non-state actors (Solomon, 2005: 3). In this context the OPDSC 
appears to be more progressive than its predecessors AS AS and OPDS for two 
reasons. First, it strengthens the notions of broader, expanded and integrated forms of 
regional security. This clearly indicates that security and development are no longer 
separated. Second, one member state will no longer misuse the Organ for national 
reasons as was noticed in the decision to intervene in the DRC (Solomon, 2005: 3). In 
this context SADC was expected to become more coordinated in structure and policy. 
As constructivists put it, there is a degree of reciprocity between the structure and 
policy in the sense that while structures shape the behaviour of social and political 
actors and provide valuable insights that inform their interests, such structures would 
not exist outside the well-informed practices of actors, that is policy-makers (Reus-
Smit, 2001: 218). 
The restructured OPDSC Protocol resolved some of the hotly disputed structural 
issues, such as the position of the Organ and its relationship with other institutions of 
SADC (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 47). It allowed for consultations in the decision making 
process between the Summit and the Troika5l and directs the Organ to report directly 
to the Summit under the leadership of the Troika. The OPDSC Protocol also allows 
for non-state actors and civil society participation in so far as it pledges to cooperate 
49 Article 3(1) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation provides that the OPDSC 
is an institution of SADC and shall report to the Summit. 
" Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ is a mechanism that provides general guidelines that spell out 
specific activities in accordance with the Protocol's objectives, and strategies for their realisation. [t 
provides the way forward through appropriate strategies in the field of defence, politics, public security 
and state security. SIPO also provides an institutional framework for the day to day implementation of 
the activities of the Organ (The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation, 2004). 
" As provided for in Article 3 ofthe Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the 
Troika consists ofthe chairperson of tile Organ, the incoming chairperson who also assumes the 
position of the deputy chairperson of the Organ and the outgoing chairperson. 
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with the actors in matters pertaining to regional securitys2 This seeks to provide a 
link with the developmental concerns of the SADC proper and has it resemble the 
making of a security community. 
In an attempt to implement the objectives of the OPDSC in 2001, the Summit 
instructed the Ministerial Committee of the OPDSC to develop the regional Strategic 
Indicative Plan (SIPO) that would address the strategic priorities in terms of 
operationalising the Organ. The core objective of SIPO revolves around creating "a 
peaceful and stable political and security environment within which the region will 
endeavour to realise its socio-economic objectives" (SADC Summit Final 
Communique, 2004: 1). This was finally approved by the Heads of State at the 
Summit held in Dar-es-Salaam in 2003 and officially launched in Mauritius in August 
2004 (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 49). While SIPO intends to operate within the 
framework of four sectors including defence, politics, public security and state 
security, more emphasis will be put on the defence sector because it is the most 
prioritised of all the sectors. However, the implementation of the objective of OPDSC 
through SIPO seems difficult due to the affirmation of the principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention in the Protocol. 
4.5 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation (SIPO) 
The SIPO aspires to function in accordance with Article 4 and Article 5 of the SADC 
Treatys3. It is the mechanism that seeks to inculcate the observance of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law; it also intends to strengthen common values and a 
common culture within SADC member states. As the preceding argument 
demonstrates, the intention of the OPDSC through SIPO is to promote trust and 
reciprocity among SADC member states not only by coordinating policies, but by 
ensuring their implementation. This opens the way for increasing institutional 
" Article 10 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation recognises that political, 
defence and security matters transcend national and regional boundaries as such "cooperation in these 
matters between State Parties and Non-state Parties and between states Parties and organisations other 
than SADC shall be accepted". 
53 Article 4 provides for the observance of "human rights, democracy and the rule of law as principles 
guiding its members. Article 5 (b) directs member states to "promote political values, systems and 
other shared values whieh are transmitted through institutions which arc democratic legitimate and 
effective". Sub-section (c) of Article 5 provides for the consolidation, defence and maintenance of 
democracy, peace, security and stability (SADC Treaty. 1992). 
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capacity that would provide effective management systems, resource mobilisation and 
institutional reforms directed to the areas of the objectives and the common agenda of 
SADC (Landsberg, 2002: 9). SIPO has also realised that resource mobilisation 
requires partnerships with extra-regional actors such as the World Bank, IMF, and UN 
to mention but a few, to cope with effective performance in the field of "peace 
support and humanitarian operations, disaster management and ... building capacity in 
the area of preventive diplomacy peace and security" (SIPO, 2004: 6). These 
institutions play a part in creating security communities by attaching some 
conditionalities to the adherence to a particular system of political and economic 
management issues, which have impact on peace and security (Ngoma, 2005: 2). 
With this in mind, there is a sense in which SIPO provides an avenue for non-state 
actors and civil society in matters relating to security and development. This paves the 
way for regional bodies such as SADC Parliamentary Forum which, also "promotes 
peace, security and stability ... by supporting development of conflict resolution 
mechanisms"s4 Taking this into account it may be assumed that, at least on paper, 
SIPO meets some of the criteria for security community building by promoting 
mutual trust and guaranteeing the dependable expectation of "peaceful change" 
(Deutsch, cited in Ngoma, 2005: 8). 
To put its intentions into effect, SIPO requires an effective system of governance as a 
mechanism for intervention by SADC member states. Although SADC's leaders have 
restructured the OPDSC and created SIPO for the effective implementation of its 
objectives, they stopped short of empowering it in terms of binding "values, 
norms ... the stuff regional community-building is made of" (Landes berg, 2002: 6). 
Adler uses the concept of an 'accountability norm' to account for this state of affairs 
and argues that a 'mutual accountability norm' replaces the norm of non-intervention 
(Adler, 1998: 2001). This means that the accountability norm permeates the 
boundaries of states. However, SIPO as a sub-structure of the OPDSC subscribes to 
the non-intervention norm. As a result, the partial surrender of sovereignty it 
advocates appears neither foreseeable nor sought-after. Under these circumstances it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for SIPO to translate its programmes into the reality. 
54 Constitutions ofthe SADC parliamentary Forum, 200 I. 
74 
On the political front, SIPO intends to promote political cooperation through the 
evolution of common political values (SIPO 2004: 18). However, this depends on the 
level of democratisation, since the process puts down political groundwork for 
increased transparency on which "more specific confidence building measures are 
built" (Hurrell, 1998: 244). SIPO is quite specific about this since the legal 
groundwork is laid down in the SADC Treaty and in the OPDSC Protocol. However, 
"the political will to fully implement these arrangements lags behind" (van 
Schalkwyk, 2005: 46). Political will requires a certain convergence of values serving 
as an important factor for binding an otherwise diverse group (Archarya, 1998: 207). 
Despite the wave of democratisation that swept across Southern Africa in the 
aftermath of the Cold War with Namibia attaining independence in 1990, the advent 
of multi-party democracy in Zambia in 1991 and the first democratic elections in 
South Africa (Gas a, 2004: 8), the region still lags behind in terms of democratisation, 
with states limited to using general presidential elections and 'multipartyism,55 as the 
only tools for measuring democratisation (Gasa, 2004: 9). While these are core 
features of democracy they are not sufficient in themselves. The key long-term 
requirement is the development of common values and standards that set up "a 
political foundation for increased transparency on which more specific confidence-
building measures are built" (Hurrell, 1998: 244). Seen in this light, democratic norms 
support the creation of civil societies which also uphold community bonds and 
common identity and trust (Acharya, 1998: 199) that in turn engender the dependable 
expectations of peaceful change. This could help prevent the democratic process 
being tilted in favour of the ruling parties. Here, the SADC Parliamentary Forum can 
be of value if effectively utilised. 
On the security front, SIPO aspires to operationalise the defence sector in 
collaboration with the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee56 (ISDSC). Here, 
" South Africa is the only country in the Southern African region that has gone beyond elections and 
multipartyism, which are so far being used as the only measuring tools for democracy in the region. 
Politically, South Africa leads the way in the field of good governance, human rights and peaceful 
resolution of conflict. Botswana and Mauritius are the only other SADC countries following on the 
path of South Africa with a "relatively stable and well-functioning democratic system" (Hammerstad, 
2005: 14). 
" Established as a sub-structure of Frontline States, the ISDSC served as an advisory body and 
implemented decisions and resolutions of the FLS Summit meetings. When the FLS was disbanded the 
ISDSC was retained (Cilliers, 1999: 1). 
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the prioritisation of the military approach to security is quite clear. The ISDSC as a 
military-oriented institutional operational arm for the OPDSC has provided an outlet 
and opportunity (Leysens and Thompson, 2003: 58) for state-centred security 
conception. The deliberations of security matters in the ISDSC is dominated by 
members of the security forces including the military, police and intelligence 
agencies, who are intrinsically suspicious of the participation of the civil society in 
regional security matters (Tsie, 1998: 5). Their main preoccupation in the conflict 
prevention and management revolves around the conduct of peace support operations 
through regional peacekeeping training. For example, a string of joint peace support 
exercises such as the exercise Blue Hungwe, Blue Crane and Tanzanite have been 
carried out (SIPO, 2004: 6). 
With the ISDSC, SIPO seeks to operationalise the SADC Mutual Defence PactS7 by 
promoting and disseminating the pact within member states' institutions. The aim is 
to develop a collective security capacity to respond to external military threats (SIPO, 
2004: 27). Understood in this context, the pact clearly reproduces a neo-realist reading 
of security in Southern Africa with the perceived external threats acting as a catalyst 
for states' cooperation that usually serves as a tenet of realist theory of alliances 
(Acharya, 1998: 203). By extrapolation, the pact reduces all security matters in the 
region to an external threat while at the same time protecting member states from 
external criticism in terms of human rights abuses and political repression committed 
within states. It does so by directing member states to "respect one another's 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and in particular observe the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of one another" (SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003: 
3). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the end of the Cold War followed by the 
demise of the apartheid regime as a destabilising factor in the region meant the 
decline of the external catalysing threat. This is clearly supported by the existing 
literature, heavily neo-realist in orientation, that deals mostly with the alliances 
origins, membership and their successes in protecting member states, and which 
presupposes that alliances falter in the absence of the threat (McCalla, 1996). A 
57 According to Article 2 the Pact its main function is to advance mutual cooperation in the areas of 
defence in security in the southern African region. 
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typical example for Southern Africa is the dissolution of the Frontline States after the 
collapse of apartheid and the resultant democratic elections in South Africa. With the 
disappearance of an external threat in Southern Africa, the defence pact raises a 
number of questions. The most intriguing one is whether the idea of a defence pact 
" ... stems from pervasive fears among ruling elite about their own stability" (Barnett 
and Gause III, 1998: 191). In reality, most insecurities and conflicts emanate from 
within states (Ayoob, 1991: 263). Here the role of SIPO is to propel the region 
towards a security community with its security perceptions geared towards addressing 
internal instabilities, conflict prevention and conflict management within the SADC 
groupmg. 
4.6 Evaluating the OPDSC's Prospects for Transforming the Region into a 
Security Community 
The institutional restructuring of the OPDSC through SIPO requires a high level of 
commitment and trust as well as creating the environment favourable for its effective 
implementation. In most part, the effectiveness of policies largely depends on their 
implementation in which the intentions of the policy-maker are truly tested (Makoa, 
2004: 72). From this viewpoint, it could be argued that while SADC is good at 
making inspiring policies and adopting impressive-sounding norms, it is weakened by 
its inability to ensure that outcomes and practices of such initiatives match their 
creation. Whereas norms such as democracy, governance, peace and security have 
attained currency in the SADC protocols and communiques, efforts to realise them in 
practice stop short of meeting the challenge for creating an effective regional 
community (Ladesberg, 2002:4). Specifically, most SADC Protocols58 including the 
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation are "still a declaration of 
intent" rather than reflective of objective conditions that could help transform the 
region into a security community (Sukma, 2003: 3). 
In sum, SADC does not have a record of doing well in terms of implementing 
decisions, and reducing its inherent disparity between formulating and adopting 
norms and values and realising them in practice. This has often resulted in a failure to 
58 Article 2 (2) (c) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation clearly provides for 
common evolution of political values and institutions while Article 5 of the SADC Treaty also seeks to 
promote common political value systems and other shared values transmitted through institutions 
which are democratic legitimate and effective. 
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meet most of its impressive policy objectives (Landsberg, 2002: 2). While the 
establishment of SIPO is regarded as a positive effort to bring about a sustainable 
security in the region, it sadly lacks empirical content. Measured against Adler's 
enabling conditions elaborated in chapter 4, the environment in which SIPO is to 
operate does not provide a favourable climate. For example, there is a conflict 
between Adler's notion of the accountability norm which renders states accountable 
to one another for their actions, and the non-interference principle entrenched in the 
OPDSC Protocol. The non-interference norm does not allow for effectiveness and 
weakens states from connecting compliance with stated norms (Adler, 1998: 135). 
With the non-interference norm, the main preoccupation of SIPO still remains the 
military form of security in the region that prioritises the defence pact over other 
equally important issues such as economic and environmental security. 
The defence sector as such remams inherently state-centred and "dominated by 
orthodox military thinking" (Soderbaum, 2001: 109). It does not seem to bring any 
substantial progress in terms of propelling the region towards the level of a security 
community. Clearly, the main objective of this sector is to build a capacity for 
member states to anticipate and prevent conflict to promote national security and 
freedom of such states to exercise sovereignty and maintain order and stability 
(Makoa, 2003: 98). There are a number of reasons with which one can substantiate 
this assertion. One of those reasons is that the dynamics at play in the region do not 
lend credence to the possibility of foreign aggression. Despite the rhetoric of foreign 
aggression, the sense of insecurity that most states experience in Southern Africa 
originates within their boundaries rather than from outside (Ayoob, 1991: 263). The 
question that merits attention at this point is where, in the context of post-Cold War 
and post-apartheid Southern Africa, the external threat is meant to originate from 
(Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 9). The issue of an external threat is merely intended as 
a diversion of focus away from elites' interests, whilst the main preoccupation within 
states remains basically "internal threats to the security of their structures and to 
regimes themselves" (Ayoob, 263). In general, the prospects for transforming the 
region into a security community therefore remain predicated upon softening the 
notion of sovereignty to allow for non-state actors in conflict resolution and conflict 
management. 
78 
5.0 HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY THINKING 
Chapter Four discussed an attempt by the Southern African region to assert itself as a 
security community from the early 1990s up to the present. The Windhoek Workshop 
proposals served as a point of departure for merging regional security with 
development thereby bringing about processes and developments associated with 
human security. As a result, "more progress in community-building was expected" 
(Barnett and Gause, 1998: 162). However, many of the obstacles to sustainable 
security and cooperation became quite recognisable and included "possessive 
sovereignty" (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 182), a lack of compatibility of values, 
mutual trust, political will and weak institutions. SADC was indeed overwhelmed by 
a multitude of obstacles, which clearly paralysed its institutional and functional 
capacity. As such, the objective of this chapter is an attempt to promote the 
reorientation of its regional security architecture from one that is neo-realist in 
perspective towards one which adopts a constructivist agenda of human security and 
advocates the development of collective norms that make up the social identities of 
actors (Risse, 2000: 5) in the region. 
5.1 Human security defined 
In the SADC region, human security thinking should decidedly not be viewed through 
the lens of neo-realist foreign policies, but in the context of a constructivist approach 
that calls for common values and norms that can bring different state and non-state 
actors in the region together. The strength of the new security thinking framework is 
contingent upon the SADC's ability to institutionalise human security elements in its 
political and military decision-making. Hapson and Hay argue that there is a rising 
appreciation of the importance of human security in the areas of democratisation, 
peace-building, conflict prevention, refugees and migration and human rights 
promotion (Hapson and Hay, 2002: 3). They offer three distinct conceptions of human 
security that characterise current debates and thinking about the subject. 
The first one is a natural rights law conception of human security; anchored in deep-
seated liberal assumptions of basic individual rights associated with life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness. A second view is humanitarian in the sense that it includes 
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international efforts to expand and reinforce international law, especially in regard to 
genocide and war crimes and eliminates weapons that are dangerous to civilians and 
non-combatants. The third view proposes that human security should be broadly 
constructed to take account of economic, environmental, social and other forms of 
harms (Hapson and Hay, 2002: 4-5). All these different perspectives are of value and 
therefore relevant for redefining security in Southern Africa towards human security. 
For the purpose of this study, human security is defined as a "shift in perspective or 
reorientation that takes people as its point of reference, rather than focusing 
exclusively on security of territories or governments" (Axworthy, as quoted in 
Handingam, 2000: 155). It is the approach that is for the most part concerned with 
addressing insecurities by placing the human subject at the core of its analytical focus. 
The United Nations Development Project (UNDP) coined the idea of human security 
in 1994. In doing so, the organisation moved away from the neo-realist traditional 
definition of security. Whereas this traditional definition of security meant the 
security of territories from external aggression or protection of national interests 
(Lawson, 2003: 90), excluded from this definition were the more primary concerns of 
ordinary people who desperately needed security in the conduct of their daily lives59 
(Lawson, 2003: 90). In this context, the UNDP has provided SADC as a development-
centred organisation with a framework to move beyond the state-centred approach to 
security "towards a more coordinated, transparent, norm-based and institutionalised 
structure" (Soderbaum, 2001: 108). As a consequence, there is a need for SADC to 
reform its regional security structures to make them more accommodating of the idea 
of human security. 
Selebi recognises the importance of the idea of human security in Southern Africa by 
arguing that viable, democratic and open nation states that are people-centred are 
fundamentally indispensable conditions for any effort to achieve sustainable security 
in the region (Selebi, 1999: 3). According to him, only such human rights-based 
nation states are capable both individually and collectively as a region of engaging the 
overwhelming challenges of sources of insecurity. Any attempt that addresses 
" As such, the UNDP offered the notion of human security an empirical content by encouraging states 
to redirect resources from military spending towards the development agenda (Ax worthy, as cited in 
Hadingam, 2000: 155, Poku and Edge, 2001: 2) such as housing, education and social projects. 
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regional security on the basis of national security only, "without paying an adequate 
attention to human and environmental security, will fail to address the basic cause of 
conflicts and instability that afflict parts of the region. Only integrated and holistic 
treatment of these facets of ... security is capable of ensuring long-term sustainable 
development, peace and security in southern Africa" (Selebi, 1999: 3). 
5.2 The Significance of the Human Security Agenda in Southern Africa 
The significance of the human security agenda in Southern Africa goes along with the 
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. With South Africa, which served as a source 
of insecurity in the region venturing, on a transition from a white minority regime to 
an inclusive constitutional democracy, a change of regional security structure became 
a necessity (Landesberg, 2002: 5). It was because of the search for a new security 
agenda and a more organised political and security community that regional states 
signed the Declaration of the Treaty of Windhoek in 1992 to establish SADC 
(Landesberg, 2002: 5). However, despite the incorporation of human dimensions of 
security in the SADC Treaty6o, member states have not carried out this broader 
reorientation for several reasons. Firstly, the preoccupation with state security 
continues to obscure the difference between the state, popular interests and diversity 
of values. Secondly, internal conflicts, intra-state and inter-state migration and 
environmental problems are not dealt with under the security policies and interests of 
nation-states (Poku and Graham, 2000: 9). 
The application of this traditionally conditioned definition of the concept of security 
to the Southern African situation and its practical application through SADC ought to 
be transcended intellectually and practically. This is so because a sense of insecurity 
originates from within the boundaries of the states rather than from outside and 
pervades the region. Although this does not rule out the existence of external threats, 
the assumption is that "where external threats do exist they often attain salience 
primarily because of insecurities and conflicts that abound ... within states" (Ayoob, 
1991: 263). The conflict in the DRC after 1997 and its resultant spillover to the 
neighbouring countries, as well political instability in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, 
6() Article 4 of the SADC Treaty commits member states to act in accordance with the principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The observance of these principles is a necessary 
condition for the achievement of security and development in the region. 
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Malawi 2004, Zambia 1991 , Swaziland from 1994 to the present and, more 
importantly, in Zimbabwe after 2000 bear a testimony to these insecurities. Despite 
the fact that these engender negative spillover, SADC is unable to address this 
paralysis. 
Given the aforementioned situation, it is important to look at security in Southern 
Africa through "fresh eyes" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 285). To achieve these, 
embracing binding norms and common values is a preliminary requirement that can 
raise a regional profile in terms of emancipatory human security. A concept of 
emancipation means assigning a priority to the freedom of people as individuals or 
groups (Booth, 1991: 318-319). However, the proposed human security agenda does 
not ignore or downplay the continuing relevance of state security; it seeks to 
transform the regional security structure to find a trade-off between state security and 
other non-state forms of security. 
The trade-off is needed because during the Cold War and apartheid destabilisation, 
realist security thinking accorded primacy to the military power and the preservation 
of the status quo, which brought about human insecurity and regional instability. As a 
replacement for these realist state-centred values informing regional security, a more 
secure foundation is human security, which amounts to "the pursuit of emancipation 
since it encourages focus on the people, justice and change" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 
297). Booth and Vale see emancipation as one of the powerful forces of the twentieth 
century. They cite the end of apartheid as the most spectacular event in the history of 
Southern Africa for the reason that the oppressed majority in South Africa tirelessly 
worked with progressive international forces in search of its universal emancipation 
from racism (Booth and Vale, 1995: 297). It is this situation that brought Southern 
AfTica to the threshold of a security community. 
5.3 Non-Military Sources ofInsecurity in Southern Africa 
It was argued earlier in this chapter that security in the context of Southern Africa is 
not only related to military dimensions as is often assumed in the Western realist 
explanations, but to dimensions already taken care of in the West (Ayoob, 1991: 259). 
These include the persistent incidence of poverty, underdevelopment, ethnic strife, 
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enforced population movements and environmental degradation that render the long 
term security of nation states in the region beyond reach (Selebi, 1999: 3). A critical 
exanlination of these non-military sources of security is discussed at length below. 
5.3.1 Political Instability 
Efforts to attain some level of human security III the regIOn are hampered by 
continuing political instability. The region has experienced election-related 
disturbances between opposition parties and the ruling governments. As Matlosa 
persuasively argues, "this conflict adversely affects the democratic consolidation 
process, for it brings about the contested legitimacy and the credibility of the state and 
the acceptability of the rules of the game" (Matlosa, 2004: 4). In Zimbabwe, the 
conflict has occurred between the opposition MDC and the ruling ZANU-PF; III 
Malawi between Malawi Young Pioneers and the Muluzi goveITlll1ent; III 
Mozambique between Renamo and the central goveITlll1ent, in Zambia between the 
MMD and UNIP; in the DRC between goveITlll1ent forces supported by Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola and rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda; in Swaziland, the 
struggle for democracy has run up against a traditionally repressive monarchy; in 
Lesotho, the military involvement have been a continuing focus on internal politics 
for years (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997: 199). In Angola, while the death ofthe UNITA 
leader Jonas Savimbi inspired hope for many Angolans, it is apparent that "necessary 
conditions for democratic elections are not yet in place" (Mashe1e, 2003: 18). "By the 
criteria listed above, it is therefore equally doubtful whether Southern Africa could 
constitute a security community" (Solomon, and Cilliers, 1997). Over and above, "it 
is important national coherence, consensus, political stability, and political unity exist 
within the different states, so that regional cooperation can be successfully 
conducted . .. "(Nkiwane, 1995: 3). 
Despite the fact that multiparty elections are on the increase in the region, political 
instability has not been adequately addressed. In Zimbabwe, for example, the severity 
of human rights abuses has increased with the rise of a strong opposition, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) after 2000. The situation has included 
direct and partisan involvement by formal state institutions including the army and the 
police (Human Rights Watch, 2001) in human rights abuses. Southern African states 
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have been mere spectators in the political process while democratic values, human 
rights, and good governance were being manifestly subverted by a member state. This 
serves as a testimony that SADC is not prepared to institute sanctions against 
members who violate democratic values. Instead of responding to international 
disapproval of the situation in Zimbabwe, the ISDSC "expressed serious concern on 
the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some member states, 
especially Zimbabwe which has embarked on the agrarian reform programme aimed 
at addressing the problem of poverty" (ISDSC Final Communique, 9 August, 2002). 
The situation shows that in the region democracy is purchased at the expense of 
maintaining a posture of unity and solidarity (Nathan, 2004: 3-4). It clearly attests to 
the preoccupation with state sovereignty and non-interference principles in the region. 
Nathan argues, "Far from remaining silent, SADC repeatedly expressed solidarity 
with the Zimbabwe government and condemned sanctions imposed on it by United 
States and European Union (EU)" (Nathan, 2004: 11). 
Apart from Zimbabwe, human rights activists have further pressed SADC to take 
action against Swaziland's repressive monarchy. In Swaziland, the monarchy 
maintains control over public and private institutions, civil liberties are basically non-
existent and civil society is severely restricted (Afro I News, 2001 : 1). Political 
opposition parties have been barred from operating since April 1973 when the late 
King Sobhuza II suspended the constitution (Maroleng, 2003: 2). Swaziland has 
effectively operated under a state of emergency since 1973. While SADC intervened 
diplomatically in 1996 to persuade the Swazi monarchy to push for new constitutional 
reforms, the situation has not yet changed (Southscan, 1996: 231). With the new draft 
constitution in place in 2002, the King still retains executive powers and controls the 
judiciary. Despite this diplomatic intervention, the Swazi government introduced a 
repressive internal security act in 2002 which provides for harsh penalties for anyone 
participating in political demonstrations (Maroleng, 2003: 3). All these conditions 
militate against the development of sustainable peace and security in Southern Africa. 
In Mozambique, while the civil war ended in 1992 and culminated in democratic 
elections in 1994, there is still the degree of election-related political instability. For 
example in February 2000, RENAMO issued two ultimatums to the ruling FRELIMO 
government threatening to set up a separate government in the north in protest against 
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the outcome of the elections. RENAMO's claim that the elections were rigged 
heightened the probability of violence (SouthS can, 2000: 20) and was indicative of 
the fact that democracy is not yet consolidated. In Angola, while the civil war was 
ended by the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the country is still 
grappling with the past. Since Savimbi's departure from the political arena, a far-
reaching democratisation process has only hesitantly unfolded. Post-conflict Angola is 
faced with considerable challenges, including among others securing sustainable 
peace, democratising political life, resettling refugees, promoting national 
reconciliation, and the "demobilisation and resettlement of former UNIT A and 
govemment forces" (Mashele, 2003: 18-19). Another important factor is the levelling 
of the playing field for future elections to avoid the repercussions of the 1992 
elections, which witnessed the resurgence of war. 
5.3.2 Mass Migration 
Alongside political oppression, mass migration presents itself as a source of insecurity 
in Southern Africa because of the economic implications to the host state of the large 
immigrant population, which can be potentially devastating. The underlying economic 
implications include the deterioration of the natural resource base and its capacity to 
support the popUlation of the host state (Poku and Graham, 2000: 20). In South 
Africa, for example, the problem of illegal immigrants does not only have economic 
implications, but it also has social ones (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 3). According to 
Booth and Vale "international experience shows that when cross-border migration 
develops a certain momentum new issues surface: drug-smuggling and unimpeded 
spread of small arms are major elements in a new and vibrant subculture of border 
economies in southern Africa" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 287). The escalation of crime 
and violence, prostitution, arms and drug-trafficking, car theft and armed robberies 
are increasingly connected to the rising number of illegal immigrants (Solomon and 
Cilliers, 1996: 3). Similarly, there are severe health risks associated with illegal 
immigrants, for instance the infection and control of pandemics such HIV/AIDS 
becomes almost impossible (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 3). Mass migration is also 
responsible for the high level of brain drain to South Africa from other SADC states. 
Logically, a brain drain has a range of damaging effects on country's already ailing 
economy. "Among these are the adverse effects on economic growth and the 
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reduction country's capacity to develop as a 'knowledge society' and therefore 
compete effectively in the global economy. A brain drain also constitute a major loss 
of investment in terms of the education and training of its highly skilled 
professionals" http://www.hsrc.ac.zalmedial2004/2/HRD F actSheet5 . pdf 
5.3.3 Food Security 
In Southern Africa, few countries are capable of producing enough food to meet the 
demands of their populations. The region is therefore experiencing critical food 
insecurity as a result of widespread poverty, political instability, civil wars and poor 
economic management, as well as recurring droughts. For six countries combined 
together in the SADC region, including Lesotho Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, over 15 million people currently require food assistance 
(SADC FANR Vulnerability Assistance Committee, 2003: 2). Without doubt, this 
situation has impacted on regional security. Whenever poverty exists there is a 
"corresponding danger to humankind, exposing them to threats such as disease, 
unemployment and environmental degradation, while denying the access to benefits 
such as clean water, and adequate sanitation and health care, as well as basic 
education" (Handingam, 2000: 118). 
The World Food Programme, the World Agricultural Organisation and the SADC 
have appealed to donor governments in the world to respond quickly with food aid 
donations to prevent the widespread hunger from developing into a humanitarian 
disaster (Thakalekoala, 2005: 3). The insufficient production of staple foods and other 
agricultural products has also aggravated food insecurity in the region. Lack of 
foreign exchange in the region and in Africa generally to redress the scarcity through 
commercial imports of grain is also a cause for major concern (Solomon and Cilliers, 
1996: 4). 
The abovementioned situation makes conditions for economIc growth and 
development extremely unfavourable in Southern Africa. Ordinary people sustain 
their living by subsistence farming or through the informal sector of self-help 
production and exchange that make up the real economies of most countries in the 
region (Sorensen, 1997: 261). This human insecurity is in part associated with 
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agricultural policies which often marginalise small scale farmers, since their access to 
resources such as credit, fertilizers and technical know-how is limited. The state of 
affairs is responsible for low productivity, persistent food shortages and attendant 
poverty (Discussion Document, 1998: 11). As a result, intra-regional trade in 
agricultural goods remains small and goes along with the poor performance in the 
agricultural sectors. In the absence of commercial farming in the region, the search for 
a long-term food security has to be counterbalanced by increasing imports of cereals 
and the provision of food aid. In essence, when food shortages overlap with mass 
migration, the result is the breakdown of the society (Booth and Vale, 1995: 296). 
5.3.4 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
The dangers to human welfare and safety in Southern Africa are in most part 
worsened by the current economic conditions and by the policies of structural 
adjustment (McLean, 2001: 124). Structural Adjustment Programmes are loans from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for the poor countries in 
which "a credit depends on the degree to which the member state complies with the 
determined conditions" (Lensink, 1996: 79). These loans have worsened pre-existing 
situations of poverty and underdevelopment in Southern Africa. They have increased 
states ' dependency on the richer nations, despite the claim that the programme will 
reduce poverty (Shah, 2005: I). While the SAP has been imposed on the pretext of 
ensuring debt repayment and economic restructuring, it required poor countries to 
withdraw from welfare and education programmes by reducing their spending on 
health, education and development (Shah, 2005: I). 
In Zambia, for example, the SAP was introduced in the 1990s to minimise "subsidies, 
currency devaluation, wage freezes and trade liberalisation". The key objective was to 
reduce the role of the government sector, "these policy prescriptions . . . did not hold in 
Zambia's case" (Berolsky, 2000: 96). Instead they brought about general economic 
depression and undermined the ability of governments to "create and maintain the 
conditions necessary for human security. Diversion of government funding from vital 
areas such as health and education ... inevitably compromises the delivery of services 
focused on addressing fundamental human needs" (Hadingam, 2000: 118). 
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5.3.5 HIV/ AIDS 
Regional insecurity is also undermined by the high incidence of diseases. Alongside 
the commonly known diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS and its consequences is a major cause for concern. According to Oxfam 
International, Southern Africa has the worst rate of HIV infection in the world, with 
an inescapable impact on children, on family structures and children's lives (Oxfam 
International, 2002: 2). The HIV I AIDS epidemic covers all areas of social economics 
and political life. The disease has devastated towns and villages and undermined 
fragile societies. The number of people who have contracted the disease in the region 
is estimated at "11.4 million, almost 30 per cent of global cases in a region that 
contains only 2 per cent of global population" (Apps, 2005: 2). 
According to the SADC FANR Assessment Vulnerability Committee, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe are the most affected61 . The pandemic affects the 
individual health as well as economic and social well-being of households, 
communities and nations. HIV I AIDS wipes out the productive labour force to the 
extent that, "most of the children have been forced to become heads of households as 
a result of the death of one or both of their parents ... children are dropping out of 
school in large numbers in order to fend for themselves in the absence of their 
parents" (Thakalekoala, 2005: 2). Further costs are the "impoverishment of families, 
loss of human capital, drop in productivity, decline in savings and spending on 
education and increased expenditure on caring for children orphaned by the disease" 
(Landsberg, 2002: 7-8). 
Oxfam also attributes the AIDS scourge to food security in Southern Africa by 
claiming that "the hunger currently experienced by millions across the region 
increases the likelihood of HIV infection ... these include travelling to search for food 
and additional sources of income, migrating ... and most lethally women exchanging 
sex for money or food. These actions facilitate the spread of HIV (Oxfam 
International, 2002: 2). "People weakened by HIV find it harder to access food, 
61 According to SADC FANR Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 31 per cent of the population in 
Lesotho has contracted the disease, with Swaziland registering 33.1 per cent, Zimbabwe 33.7. While 
the report does not provide figures for Botswana, according to UNAIDS, its figure is estimated at 35.8 
per cent. 
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because they are often not strong enough to work or walk long distances to the 
market" (Oxfam International, 2002: 2). In this context the HlV / AIDS scourge in 
indeed a humanitarian disaster in Southern Africa. 
5.3.6 Small Arms Proliferation 
The availability and spread of small arms appears to be one of the key dynamics 
encouraging conflict, crime, human rights abuses and underdevelopment in Southern 
Africa (Gamba and Chachiua, 1999: 2). The small arms that have become tradable 
commodities in the region are mostly, if not entirely, inherited from the legacy of the 
Cold War and wars of liberation and South African apartheid destabilisation. With the 
end of these wars Southern Africa had been left with a huge number of weapons 
which "have kept social stability and human development hostage as they are used to 
fuel crime and violence" (Gamba and Chachiua, 1999: 2). As the region entered an 
era of relative peace with the end of the civil war in Angola in 2002, the problems 
related to small arms proliferation, of which the AK 47 assault rifle is an example 
attest to the level of insecurity in Southern Africa. Crimes by heavily armed assailants 
have increased since weapons are used for a variety of different purposes including 
murders, robberies, car hijacking and so on. On the other hand, the weapons help 
transform ethnic differences into ethnic conflict and political differences into political 
conflicts (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996: 5). 
5.2.7 Livestock Rustling 
Livestock rustling has been one of the major sources of insecurity in Southern Africa, 
especially between Lesotho and South Africa. However, since October 1994, it took 
on a new dimension that seriously strained relations between people along the border 
with the Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zu1u Natal (Moeletsi, 2000: 72). There are many 
causal factors surrounding this source of insecurity. Prominent among them has been 
the retrenchment of mineworkers from South African mines which caused a high rate 
of unemployment in Lesotho. Being unemployed means that these former 
mineworkers become prone to criminal activities of which stock theft is one visible 
manifestation. This problem has caused havoc along the borders of Lesotho and South 
Africa, "many times Basotho cattle rustlers cross into the neighbouring South African 
farms and steal cattle and other livestock and take them into Lesotho"(Thakalekoala, 
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2003: 2). This has often culminated in fierce clashes between citizens of South Africa 
and Lesotho that resulted in the burning down of several cattle posts on the Lesotho 
side of the border, accordingly straining good relations between the inhabitants along 
the border (Thakalekoala, 2003: 2). 
In 1995, for example, the nature of livestock rustling assumed a new character and 
"became more marked by armed violent raids, abductions, murders and revenge 
attacks". On January 13 1996, about 40 Basotho men armed with RI rifles raided a 
cattle post near New Gate in South Africa and stole 800 cattle; the South African 
National Defence Force intercepted them and killed three suspects during the 
exchange of fire. On the 23 January 1996, Basotho men armed with automatic 
firearms launched a cross border raid and captured 560 sheep, 70 cattle and 12 horses 
in the Tabase area. On South Africa's part, on 12 May 1996, about 300 South African 
men raided a village on the Lesotho side and took 100 cattle, 30 horses, 14 donkeys 
and 1000 goats and sheep (Moeletsi, 2000: 73). There is no doubt that these cross 
border crimes left many families who earn their livelihood from stock farming 
destitute. Therefore this made their lives vulnerable to other forms of insecurity such 
as poverty, unemployment and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
5.2.8 Drug-Trafficking 
Drug-trafficking in Southern Africa should be seen as a major challenge to human 
insecurity. This crime has been mostly noticeable with the end of apartheid and the 
expansion of international trade in the region. Many criminal gangs involving several 
nationalities operate in drug-trafficking and other forms of organised cross-border 
crime. Nigerian residents playa leading role and collaborate with local groups from 
other continents. Drug-trafficking goes hand in hand with other organised crime 
including large-scale smuggling of firearms and stolen vehicles and related money 
laundering. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/southern africa programme.pdf This directly 
or indirectly is a symbol of an economic gain for dangerous actors and economic 
resources generated from this organised crime are directly and deliberately used for 
destabilising the societies (Politi, 1997: 13). 
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5.4 Reforms in the Regional Security Architecture 
Having assessed non-military sources of regional insecurity, there is a necessity for 
the expansion of regional security structures to accommodate human security needs. 
This should be made in such a manner that they match up with the developmental 
goals of the SADC proper. The regional security structures should take into account 
and be responsive to the achievement of development and economic growth, 
alleviation of poverty, enhancing "the standard and quality of life of the people of 
Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration" 
(Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992). A first step is the achievement of peace, 
security and political democracy, which represent the preconditions for sustainable 
development and human security. The search for a human security, reforms in 
security architecture at the regional and domestic levels can be pursued through 
structures of governance based on cooperation, participation, accountability, 
transparency and the rule of law. The SADC Parliamentary Forum62 represents this 
type of structure in the region. In the first instance, the reforms should by 
complemented by "promoting the establishment of democratic institutions, supporting 
free and fair elections and fostering the development of civil society" (Adler, 1998: 
129). At least on paper, SADC has recognised this by establishing the Principles and 
Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections in the region adopted in Mauritius in 
2004. 
To consolidate SADC mechanisms such the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the 
SADC Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections, the reforms 
geared towards improving a regional security architecture should be made in such a 
way as to allow civil society to find recognition and acceptance for advancing human 
security. This largely depends on the political will emanating from member states, 
based on their democratic stance. By and large, a new understanding of security in the 
region warrants the approach that can effectively confront non-military threats 
62 The SADC Parliamentary Forum is an autonomous regional institution of the Southern African 
Development Community which seeks to strengthen the implementation capacity of SADC by 
involving the representatives of peoples of the region. This includes involving Parliamentarians of 
member states in SA DC activities in terms of Article 5 of the constitution. The SADC Parliamentary 
Forum delegation to elections consults with electoral stakeholders and other observers, and attends 
election-related meetings and rallies, observing the campaign, analysing media coverage of the 
electoral process, voting, counting, tabulation and announcement of results among other election-
related activities. 
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mentioned above. However, the most difficult or challenging problem in the Southern 
African context is "how to balance traditional restrictive norms of national 
sovereignty and non-interference" with the evolving notion of cooperative security 
(Hammerstad, 2005: 7). 
Cooperative security permeates "domestic policies of sovereign states by holding 
them accountable to regional and international norms". According to the proponents 
of cooperative security, the restrictive neo-realist understanding of security should be 
balanced by the wide-ranging acceptance of the recognition for pursuing cooperative 
security to deal with the root causes of conflict. Similarly, the norm of sovereignty has 
to be complemented by the norms of human rights. Equally important is the fact that 
"the norm of non-interference should only apply when the states behave according to 
regional and international standards of decency,,63 (Harnmerstad, 2005: 8). 
Involving the civil society actors in drafting and executing policy on security and 
development is important since these actors can playa major part in interacting with 
the state and non-state structures, especially on the issues relating to broader non-
military security threats mentioned above (International Policy Academy, 2000: 6). 
They can help reinforce the activities of regional organisations whose cooperative 
security agenda includes practices such as election monitoring, and other institutions 
and offices aimed at building up member states' democracy, good governance and 
human rights (Hammerstad, 2005: 8). To achieve these, the Human Rights 
Commission proposal which was mooted in the Windhoek Workshop in July 1994 
and which has since been virtually ignored should be implemented. Optimistically, 
the effective implementation of these reforms can move the region on the margins of a 
security community. 
While civil society participation in the context of advancing human security in the 
region is important, there has been a little allowance for such actors. As stated in the 
preceding chapter, the OPDS visible operational preoccupation with rather narrowly 
63 For SADC, these "community building practices" could playa key role in changing "strategic 
practices, both behavioural and rhetoric" and can also encourage the "development of collective 
identity" (Wendt, cited in Adler, 1998: 120). Moreover, this can contribute to shared understanding of 
SADC as a "region and to changing the way that peoples in the region collectively think about 
security" (Adler, 1998: 121). 
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conceived state-centric security clearly deviated from one of the provisions of the 
terms of reference of the Organ. These include ''the observance of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law and peaceful settlements of disputes by negotiation and 
mediation both of which provide avenues for the participation of non-state actors" 
(Bischoff, 2001: 283). It appears that the newly restructured OPDSC is also heading 
in this direction. While the Organ retains the abovementioned provisions in its 
Protocol, it is similarly handicapped by the affirmation of principles of sovereignty 
and non-interference. For example, these principles were used to bar the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum from monitoring the Zimbabwe March 2005 elections64 As 
argued by the South African government spokesperson Ronnie Mamoepa, "As far as 
the government is concerned, Zimbabwe has invited the national parliaments of 
SADC member states, which will allow for report backs to sovereign national 
parliaments post (after) the elections. On the other hand, the SADC parliamentary 
forum would have no fora to report back on its findings to" (Sapa, March 2005). 
Contrary to this statement, Article 3 of the SADC Parliamentary Forum stipulates that 
the forum is established in accordance of Article 9 (2) or Article 10 (6) of the SADC 
Treaty65 This act is therefore indicative of overruling some of the provisions of the 
Treaty and acting in a manner that defeats its spirit. 
The reforms aimed at achieving the necessary level of human security in the SADC 
region should transcend these symbiotic relationships between states and soften up the 
principle of absolute sovereignty. The SADC Parliamentary Forum contains elements 
of cooperative security as provided for in the SADC Treaty which are being 
effectively ignored by the SADC member states. For example, the forum pledges to 
64 During the Zimbabwe March 2005 elections, South Africa declared that the Southem African 
Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum was not an official structure and had no legal 
standing to observe elections. Reacting to media inquiries about Zimbabwe's refusal to invite the 
Forum to observe the poll, the foreign affairs department said it wished to place on record that the 
Forum was not an official structure of the SADC. Mamoepa said the official SADC observer mission, 
led by South Africa's home affairs minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, was the only legitimate body. 
"The primary responsibility for the creation of a climate for free and fair elections rests with the people 
of Zimbabwe, acting through their independent electoral commission," he added" (Sapa cited in 
Zimbabwe Infonmation Centre Archives, 2005). 
6S Article 9 (2) of the SADC Treaty provides for the establishment of other institutions deemed 
necessary by the SA DC, while Article 10 (6) directs the Summit to decide on the creation of 
Commissions, other institutions, committees and organs as need arises. 
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"promote principles of human rights and democracy within the region", enhance 
"peace security and stability on the basis of collective responsibility by supporting the 
development of permanent conflict resolution mechanisms in the SADC 
region ... encourage good governance, transparency, and accountability in the region 
and in the operation of SADC institutions", and "promote participation of non-
governmental organisations, business and intellectual community" (The Constitution 
of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2003). It could therefore be argued that while the 
forum is practically being ignored, its provisions are in conformity with the SADC 
Treaty; hence questioning its relevance is by implication tantamount to questioning 
the relevance of the treaty. 
Besides the SADC Parliamentary Forum, SADC has established mechanisms for 
guiding the conduct of elections in the region: the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections. This is a highly commendable confidence-building 
measure aimed at inculcating mutual trust and reducing election-related conflict 
which have characterised the region. Among others, these principles advocate the 
"consolidation of citizens' participation in the decision-making processes and 
consolidation of democratic practices and institutions". These also include "freedom 
of association, political tolerance, and equal opportunity for political parties' access in 
the media, independent judiciary and impartiality of electoral institutions" (Principles 
and Guidelines Governing SADC Democratic Elections, 2004). Unfortunately, this 
has proven to be only a declaration of intent in the sense that, in practice, SADC 
countries "subsequently abstained from saying anything critical about the run up to 
and conduct of the March 2005 elections in Zimbabwe even though these elections 
breached each and every one of these principles" (Harnmerstad, 2005: 9). 
5.4.1 The Involvement of Extra-regional Actors in Southern African Security 
Reforms 
Given the abovementioned situation and as a way of overcoming a stalemate, the role 
of extra-regional actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and NEPAD's 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) come into play. They can help soften up 
the state to think in terms of regional priorities instead of protecting sovereignty, 
which is a key block to bringing about a security community in the region. These 
actors are important because most of them are sources of funds, which are often 
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accompanied by conditionalities which exert pressure on governments to effect 
democratic changes. From the IMF and World Bank's points of view, governments 
that achieve agreed goals such as a good human rights record and governance and 
convincingly combat corruption receive more fimds. These funds are normally 
channelled through civil society and non-state actors, who in tum promote peace, 
human rights and community developments (Hearn, 2000: 4). In the SADC region, 
these conditionalities are imperative for "furthering the rights and political 
participation of socially excluded groups" (Hearn, 2000: 4), such as non-state actors 
and civil society actors. It has often been argued that governments have their own 
agendas and preoccupations hostile to civil society to maintain their hold on power. 
With the conditionalities in place, donors can reconcile the government and civil 
society actors to improve the level of cooperative security. In this respect, civil 
society and non-state actors will be empowered so that they can interact better with 
the states and fulfil their role in the society (Zacarias, 1998: 58). In the area of 
governance, for example, many donors are assisting domestic and regional civil 
society actors in terms of "consolidating and deepening democracy, promoting 
participatory development, protecting human rights and promoting clean and 
accountable governance" (Smith et ai, 2005: 26). 
The UN helps in maintaining order and limiting conflicts since there has indeed been 
a failure on the part of regional arrangements to resolve conflicts such as the one in 
the DRC. The UN has been assisting in providing resource capacity such as financial 
and logistical support in the areas of conflict to reinforce regional security 
arrangements (Zacarias, 1998: 58). This provides conflict management training to the 
parties in conflict and the civil society and increases the capacity for dialogue, 
mediation and peace-building. Apart from the UN, the role ofNEPAD's African Peer 
Review Mechanism is also important for reducing conflict. This monitoring 
mechanism allows states to work together and rise above shortcomings and 
weaknesses in their governance structure and practices. In this context, states are 
expected to evaluate their peers in a manner that will collectively elevate the bar on 
governance standards and performance. The aim of the mechanism is to foster 
stability, promote peace, security and democracy and uphold the rule of law (APRM, 
2002: 1). 
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5.4.2 Reforms in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and 
Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ. 
Despite the involvement of extra-regional actors in the regional security reforms, the 
OPDSC and its implementation framework SIPO could be expanded in order to 
accommodate human security needs in the region. While Article 10 of the OPDSC 
provides for the participation of non-state parties in the activities of SADC, such 
participation is handicapped by the fact that it should not be "inconsistent with the 
objectives and other provisions of the Protocol" and "should not impede the Organ 
from fulfilling the obligations of the Treaty and the Protocol", and that "any 
agreement between the Organ and the non-state party "shall be subject to approval by 
the Summit" (The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 200 I). The 
effect of these provisions is that the participation of civil society is expressly placed 
under the control of the SADC member states. It is difficult if not impossible for non-
state actors to participate under these conditions for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
Protocol affirms the "strict respect for sovereignty ... and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states". Secondly, fulfilling the obligations under this protocol 
incorporates upholding the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Thirdly, 
the approval by the Summit is almost impossible in part because of the affirmation of 
the abovementioned principles where the decisions are taken by consensus. This 
means that one member state that does not allow for broad-based political 
participation such as Swaziland, or who does not have a good human rights record, 
such as Zimbabwe, can disapprove the participation of civil society actors. "This 
political insecurity and the presumption that civil society actors should be compliant 
servants of the government, . .. suggests a worrying propensity for centralisation of 
power and an increasingly intolerant form of political leadership" (Smith et aI, 2005: 
26). 
Taking the abovementioned situation into account, the envisioned reforms to 
accommodate human security needs within the OPDSC require SADC to soften up 
the notion of sovereignty and replace the non-interference principle with the 
accountability norm. This will empower SIPO to effectively implement the objectives 
of the Organ held hostage by these principles. Whereas SIPO as an implementation 
framework of the Organ emphasises the need for democratic consolidation in the 
region, there should be a favourable climate to put this into practice. The favourable 
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climate involves the necessary political will and resource capacity for carrying the 
SIPO project. Such measures become not only a means of providing a durable 
solution to regional security problems, but they also shape a common identity and 
mutual trust (Adler, 1998: 128). The achievement of these can result in combining 
security with political and human dimensions, such as the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts between and within states, consolidating justice and democracy and 
advancing human rights through cooperation and confidence (Adler, 1998: 132). They 
will allow states and citizens alike in the SADC region to feel that they are indeed part 
of a larger community and their security and development are mutually intertwined. 
Through SIPO, SADC member states should also direct their efforts to improve health 
in the region, particularly in the area of HIV/AIDS, which is indeed becoming a 
source of human insecurity. This should be affected by a decrease in defence spending 
by SADC member states thereby diverting resources to programmes aimed at 
combating the disease. South Africa is the best example of a country in the region 
which has "undertaken one of the most systematic defence and security reviews" that 
"has led to considerable demilitarisation" and the abandoning of nuclear deterrence. 
This has also led to the reduction of defence spending by 60 per cent (Cawthra, 1999: 
1). Other countries in the region should also follow this example. The HIV / AIDS 
pandemic clearly indicates that SADC needs political and security structures that go 
beyond simply managing traditional state-centred security challenges. "Instead, the 
challenge is also that of addressing issues of democratic governance, growing poverty 
and inequality" (Landsberg, 2002: 8). While the SIPO document is mostly concerned 
with operationalising military security provisions of the Protocol on Politics Defence 
and Security Cooperation, it also makes reference to human security issues such as 
HIV/AIDS, human rights, poverty, gender-based violence and governance issues. 
However, civil society actors have criticised the provisions of SIPO for being too 
elaborate on military security issues while stopping short of a clearly defined 
mechanism to deal with human security challenges effectively 
http://www.ccrweb.ccr. uct.ac.za. The reforms which are aimed at improving the 
regional security issues should be made in such a way that they address this 
deficiency. 
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Finally, a human security paradigm is a requirement for the Southern African region 
to attain the level of a security community. SADC member states should indeed 
prioritise non-military security threats which have adversely affected most people in 
the region. This is where the idea of a trade-off between state security and non-
military values should come into the picture. Most of all SADC needs to overcome its 
structural problems such as the affinnation of the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention. These do not only require SADC member states to reinforce the existing 
structures, it also requires them to support these structures through their policies on 
the ground. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
Using Adler and Barnett's three tier analytical frarnework for the emergence of 
security communities and Adler's criteria for security community building as 
measuring tools, the objective of the study, as stated in Chapter One, was to 
investigate whether the Southern African region can be seen to have become a 
security community in the post-apartheid era. To achieve this objective, the thesis has 
been informed by a constructivist theory framework and criteria that explain how 
norms, identities and interests change the behaviour of social and political actors in 
the SADC region. The constructivist paradigm challenges the anarchy-inspired 
theories of realism and neo-realism which exclusively "rely on the language of force" 
to account for cooperation between states. It offers an alternative explanation of what 
is possible (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 4, Hafterdon, 1991: 5) in Southern Africa in 
terms of security cooperation. 
The study reveals that a realist tendency in the international relations of Southern 
Africa, amongst states and decision-makers, is responsible for paralysing the region. It 
is exemplified by the failure of AS AS and the dysfunctional separation of the chair of 
the OPDS from that of the SADC Summit which, resulted in the separation of the 
security function from SADC's socio-economic agenda. On the face of it, SADC 
gives little attention to political, institutional and social issues of human security and 
the construction of a security community that the Frontline States were able to 
promote through SADCC. This means that SADC member states are not able to show 
the kind of willingness and resolve that characterised cooperation amongst the 
Frontline States in the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s in terms of merging 
security with development. 
Essentially, through SADCC, the Frontline States afforded post-independent Southern 
African governments a platform for economic cooperation in an attempt to marry 
security with development. "A second very important achievement was SADCC's 
role in fostering a regional identity and a common political outlook on important 
issues. The policy frameworks developed by SADCC were also important in policies 
and approaches in member states countries" (Ie Pere and Tjonneland, 2005: 4). These 
confidence-building practices were consistent with a security community. While a 
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similar approach by SADC would ensure cohesion in dealing with regional security 
matters in the 1990s, the region lacks this cohesive approach. 
The Frontline States' achievements were obscured by a myriad failures and 
inadequacies of SADC, which became increasingly manifest during the 1990s. From 
the mid-1990s, growing political divisions and the attendant mutual mistrust 
developed. The collapse of apartheid South Africa once the unifying external enemy, 
the incorporation of new members, such as the DRC, and "growing tensions between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a situation where SADC effectively was divided 
into two camps in dealing with political and security issues. As a result, the OPDS 
became incapacitated and unable to work" (Ie Pere, 2005: 15). Generally, these 
failures were responsible for the deterioration of the level of security in Southern 
Africa. 
Despite the changing security situation both at global and regional levels, with the 
collapse of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, levels of 
insecurity and instability continued to characterise states in Southern Africa. This has 
undermined human security in the region. Among the forces pushing in the direction 
of human insecurity were the resurgence of war in Angola; the territorial dispute 
between Botswana and Namibia; the outbreak of the broad-based war in the DRC and 
the subsequent increase in defence spending by some SADC member states such as 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. While Waever contends that a "security community is a 
non-war community" (Waever, 1998: 71), the fact that SADC member states have not 
completely abandoned "a Cold War perspective on the utility of military force as an 
instrument of foreign policy" (Nathan, 1995: 6) suggests a divergent position that 
subverts the idea of a security community. 
Another dimension has been added by non-military sources of insecurity exemplified 
by intra-state political instability, mostly related to the outcome of elections. 
Incidences of political instability have occurred in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, in 
Zambia 1991 , in Zimbabwe in 2000, 2002 and 2005, and in Malawi in 2004. 
Continuing aristocratic rule in Swaziland is also a cause for concern. Besides political 
instability, other equally important non-military sources of insecurity include mass 
migration, HIV / AIDS, food security, Structural Adjustment Programmes, small arms 
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proliferation, livestock rustling and drug-trafficking. These factors show that the 
regional security structure needs to be transfonned by bringing in non-state actors 
alongside state actors in order to find an acceptable trade-off between militaristic and 
non-state fonns of security. In essence, long tenn security, peace and stability in the 
SADC region cannot be achieved without paying adequate attention to these issues 
(Selebi, 1998: 3). In other words, security in Southern Africa should be viewed in the 
broader context of "cooperation on both military and non-military policies" 
(Nkiwane, 1995: 2). 
Apart from non-military dimensions of security, the principles of sovereignty and 
non-interference entrenched in SADC treaties and protocols continue to impede the 
process of building a security community in the region. The thesis has established a 
number of reasons to validate this claim. The SADC Treaty which was concluded in 
the period of emerging democracy in the early 1990s, insists on the principle of 
sovereign equality of states. Similarly, both ASAS and the OPDS affinned the 
principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. 
Moreover, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation concluded in 
2001 to resolve the OPDS stand-off, also affirms these principles, whilst the SADC 
Mutual Defence Pact also contains provisions for sovereignty and non-interference 
(Nathan, 2004: 19). These principles are indeed a block against bringing about a 
security community in the region. With these principles in place, it becomes obvious 
that the regional security arrangement "comprises independent political units (states) 
that have no central authority above them" (Mearsheimer, 1995: 10). Sovereignty in 
other words remains the key ideological value for states that should be protected at all 
costs "because there is no higher authority" ruling the states in the region. In other 
words, "there is no government above governments" (Claude, quoted in Mearsheimer, 
1995: 10). Admittedly, the role of global political and economic conditionality 
regimes such as the World Bank and IMF is needed to help soften up SADC states to 
think in tenns of regional priorities instead of protecting their sovereignty. 
The role of political and economic conditionality regimes enters the picture in part 
because SADC as a supranational institution is not empowered to carry out this effort. 
In the face of this, one may reasonably assume that in Southern Africa "institutions 
have minimal influence on states' behaviour and thus hold a little promise for 
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promoting stability" (Measheimer, 1995: 7) both at national and regional levels. As 
such, it "becomes difficult to think of a regional community if national communities 
are not integrated, or if political actors in a given states do not share the same outlook 
as the region" (Zacarias, 1998: 54). 
The situation in Southern Africa gives the impression that institutions such as SADC 
basically remain reflections of the neo-realist notion of the "distribution of 
power. .. and are based on self-interested calculations ... and have no independent 
effect on the behaviour of states" (Mearsheimer, 1995: 7). Viewed in this context, 
SADC intrinsically reflects a security regime. This is so because in the SADC region, 
national preferences override regional interests. The Zimbabwean alliance's 
intervention in the DRC attests to this argument. By all conditions, SADC demands a 
"realist reading and little else" (Barnett and Gause, 161: 1998). In the light of this 
account, it is difficult to suggest that the region is heading towards the achievement of 
a security community. 
The study observed that the emergence of security communities is dependent upon 
liberal democratic politics founded on democratic values which in turn allow for the 
"creation of strong civil societies; these also promote community bonds and a 
common identity and trust amongst states at both national and regional levels" 
(Acharya, 1998: 199-202). This notwithstanding, in terms of policy and structure, 
there is a minimal involvement of civil society actors in the SADC region which 
blocks their participation in conflict resolution. This blockage emanates from the 
"entrenched mistrust of majority of governments towards independent voices and 
opinions of election experts and academics in general" (Matlosa, 2005: 17). It casts a 
shadow on the integrity of civil society, thereby undermining its credibility and 
legitimacy, whilst many have demonstrated commitment to democracy, good 
governance and human rights issues (Smith et aI, 2005: 26). This clearly shows that 
the nature of democratisation in the region does not allow for the recognition of civil 
society actors either at local or regional levels. However, meaningful regional security 
structures need to have viable democratic and people-centred states in which non-state 
actors participate. 
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Taking the above into account, and using Adler and Barnett's key analytical concepts 
for the emergence of security communities, including mutual trust, collective identity 
and the dependable expectation of peaceful change, it is difficult to suggest that 
SADC is a security community or one that is in the making. The reason for this is that 
there is a low intensity of mutual trust in the region exemplified by reluctance of 
SADC member states to align their foreign policies with that of SADC as a 
supranational organisation. As a result, it may be argued that "statism and realism 
mark" most developments in SADC's security arrangements (Barnett and Gause, 
1998: 182). 
Having said the above, it is clear that the level of cooperative security and 
democratisation as a process have not been reached in Southern Africa. Although 
states have agreed to share democracy as a common norm, there is an uneven 
implementation of this aspiration. This has been demonstrated by the violation or 
manipulation of democratic norms espoused by the SADC Treaty and the OPDSC 
Protocol. These conditions militate against development because opposition forces 
and civil society actors are often not recognised. 
While socialisation and the teaching of norms in the SADC region can persuade states 
to "live up to the standards and the norms of a community" (Adler, 1998: 133), there 
is a lack of political will to commit to binding norms and common values. For all 
intents and purposes, SADC membership is not conditional. Certainly, SADC does 
not use democratic norms as a precondition for admitting members or keeping them. 
As a result, it has members such the DRC and Swaziland who are inherently 
authoritarian. Equally tellingly, SADC is not structured in such a way that admission 
to the organisation is only open to states that uphold and respect the principles set out 
in the Treaty. Countries such as the DRC and Swaziland would not have been 
accepted "on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept democratic norms; 
they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these norms" (Nathan, 2004: 
16). On these grounds countries as such Zimbabwe would have been suspended from 
SADC. Making membership possible under specific conditions would not only have 
constituted a powerful incentive for states that wished to join SADC, it would have 
also allowed SADC to "gain leverage over the process of domestic transformation in 
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these states" (Flynn and Farrel, 1999: 505). Instead of doing this, SADC is ostensibly 
regressmg. 
In the case of expectations of legitimacy measured according to the democratic 
disposition of states, and the accountability norm that renders states accountable to 
one another in their internal affairs (Adler, 1998: 134), these have proven to be 
elusive in Southern Africa. Due to the absence of an accountability norm, guided 
democracies where the serving "regimes manipulate the democratic process 
meanwhile pretending to be highly democratic are standard in Southern Africa. In 
fact, many states in the region are caught between democracy and authoritarianism" 
(Struman, 2003: 26). This inefficient nature of democratic systems accompanied by 
the anxiety that these systems are not delivering socio-economic development 
logically challenges the relevance of SADC in terms of transforming the region into a 
security community. 
Institutionally, SADC has succeeded in expanding regional security structures to 
accommodate human security issues by expanding political liberalisation. This is 
clearly manifest in the establishment of the SIPO, the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
and the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. However, their 
record of performance has not been impressive. In March 2005, for example, the 
Forum was barred from monitoring elections by SADC member state: Zimbabwe. 
Matiosa argues that "norms, values and standards to regulate behaviour of states have 
been introduced though there is a serious problem with enforcing them" (Landsberg, 
cited in Matiosa, 2005 : 5). This institutional weakness has exposed a series of 
problems. One of these problems is the capacity and political will to implement 
policies. In other words, there is a lack of tangible policy implementation in the 
SADC region. 
The March 2005 Zimbabwe elections are a clear testimony of a lack of policy 
implementation in the region. Obviously, the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections have "turned out to be a simple political solidarity 
pact among ruling parties and heads of state and government to attempt to legitimise 
even some of the overtly illegitimate electoral processes" (Matlosa, 2005: 17). 
Despite the fact that the SADC Treaty and the OPDSC Protocol provide for good 
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governance, human rights and the rule of law, SADC has refrained from criticising 
dictatorial and non-democratic member states. Moreover, instead of supporting civil 
society, as provided for in the OPDSC protocol, governments are increasingly hostile 
to these actors. In this respect, civil society is viewed as part of the opposition not 
tolerated by governments. This militates against the promotion of peace, security and 
development and has negative impact on the process of security community building. 
The question of whether SADC is a cognitive region that calls for states to construct 
regional identity and shared understanding not restricted by borders is highly 
debatable. Issues of xenophobia in Botswana and South Africa have worked against 
this idea in the region. South Africa, the strongest military and regional economy 
fears migration from the neighbouring· and other African states and the fact that its 
resources may be strained. This fear has been marked by the level of xenophobic 
practices which have saturated its social and political sectors (Zacarias, 1998: 51). 
To attain the level of a security community, in the face of a non-existent external 
threat, SADC should indeed begin to reduce its focus on the military nature of 
security. It should build structures for a more united region that supports security and 
stability. Argues Ogata, "if to be secure means freedom from fear of being killed, 
persecuted or abused; free from the abject poverty that brings indignity and self-
contempt; free to make choices - then a m~ority of people ... " (Ogata, quoted in 
Hadingham, 2000: 116) in the region do not live in security. This clearly illustrates 
that security and stability do not lie exclusively in the military dimension; 
accordingly, any attempt at regional security that seeks to guarantee state security 
only, without paying adequate attention to the human dimensions of security will fail 
to attend to the root causes of conflicts and instability that have badly affected parts of 
the region (Selebi, 1999: 3). "The shift from traditional conception of security that 
focuses on military power and balance of capabilities" to one focusing on issues of 
societal instability could be one of the most remarkable transformations in regional 
security in the 21 sl century. Dangers confronting regional security are less likely to 
emanate from planned aggression against the territories of SADC member states "but 
rather from adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious 
economic, social and political difficulties" (Williams and Neumann, 2000: 370). 
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Finally, constructivism has been found to be a fertile theoretical perspective that holds 
the key to transforming the region into a security community. In the course of using a 
constructivist theory of international relations to investigate whether the prospects and 
practices at play in Southern Africa can move the region to the margins of being a 
security community, the study has established that the tenets of this theory are not 
being fully utilised in the SADC region. There is a prevalence of state security 
concerns when it comes to the design and operation of regional security architecture. 
As a result, the region can still be considered as a security regime which lends itself to 
a neo-realist analysis. 
However, SADC's failure to become a security community need not be seen as an end 
in itself since there is still the possibility to project a more peaceful future for the 
region. The future of SADC appears to be open and the sparks that will produce 
indispensable impulses for a prosperous SADC stem from its "foundational values as 
a development community". The advancement of this idea depends on the political 
leadership of its members, the extent to which democratic pluralism becomes 
ingrained both at national and regional levels and the emergence of a strong 
partnership between member states and civil society and non-state actors which can 
collectively drive the SADC project (Ie Pere and Tjonneland, 2005: 47). The 
achievement of the above may at least, move the region to the threshold of becoming 
a security community. 
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